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ABSTRACT

Special-education litigation begins, under the terms of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), with an "impartial due process"
proceeding. States enjoy limited discretion to establish the manner by which
they will effectuate this process. Variations in implementation exist. Most
states offer a "single-tiered" process, and eight offer a "two-tiered" proceeding.
National debate about the effectiveness of these administrative
proceedings has increased over the last decade. One contested question is
whether a single-tiered or two-tiered administrative process better serves the
objectives of the Act.
Meaningful empirical examination of these specialized proceedings has
begun to inform this debate, but significant research gaps remain. No
quantitative study of these processes exists for many states' systems, including
for North Carolina's, a system with a unique two-tiered process. This Article
begins to fill this research void.
It offers an empirical evaluation of first-tier decisions issued over a 12year period in North Carolina's special-education due-process proceedings. It
identifies statistically significant due-process implementation and outcome
trends. It also evaluates the impact of factors intuitively believed to matter in
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these cases. Examples of variables considered include the availability of prehearing mediation, changes in relevant statutory standards, type of disability
accommodated, age of the child at issue, type of school, setting in which the
dispute arose (rural or urban), and petitioners' representation status.
This analysis debunks some popular conceptions about these unique
administrative proceedings, and it affirms the validity of others. It identifies
one variable, legal representation during the first-tier review, as most
significantly correlated with favorable outcomes for children with disabilities at
this stage of litigation. Ultimately, it contributes new empirical data to the
national conversation about outcomes of first-tier hearings in two-tiered dueprocess procedures under the IDEA.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, North Carolina's general statutes declare: "The goal of the State
is to provide full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities who
reside in the State."' As recently as 40 years ago, the opposite was true.
In 1965 the North Carolina General Assembly passed legislation to
prevent children with disabilities from attending public schools.2 This
legislation fulfilled its objective in two ways: it codified the then-prominent
practice to exclude children with "severe" disabilities from public schools, and
it criminalized parents' efforts to enroll these children over school-system
decisions to exclude them.3
The 1965 statute announced: "A child so severely afflicted by mental,
emotional, or physical incapacity as to make it impossible for such a child to
profit by instruction given in the public schools shall not be permitted to attend
the public schools of the State." 4
It then established: "If the parent or guardian of such a child persists in
forcing his attendance after such a report has determined that the child should

I
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1 (2015); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2) (2013) (providing
in federal law that states receiving funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
must "establish[] a goal of providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities
and a detailed timetable for accomplishing that goal").
2
1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 584, § 17, http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/sessionlaws
/html/1965-1966/ sll965-584.html.
3
See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A
Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 349, 355-56 (1990)

(summarizing legislative, administrative, and judicial activity from the late 1800s through the
1960s that either required or permitted the exclusion of children with disabilities from public
schools).
4
1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 584, § 17 (emphasis added), http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegis
lation/sessionlaws/html/1965-1966/sll 965-584.html.
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not attend the public schools, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be punished at the discretion of the court."'
Momentum to change this reality gradually grew nationally and within
North Carolina in the 1970s. Notably, in 1972, two federal district courts
declared unconstitutional the wholesale exclusion of children with disabilities
from public schools without due process or a rational reason.6 They also
introduced the affirmative principle that "[e]very retarded person between the
ages of six and twenty-one years [shall be provided] access to a free public
program of education and training appropriate to his learning capacities." 7
In 1974, shortly after issuance of these federal district court decisions
and as Congress hammered out the details of the then-forthcoming Education
for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), the North Carolina General
Assembly again took action on education for children with disabilities. It
repealed North Carolina's exclusionary and punitive 1965 statute and
recognized that "no child ... shall be excluded from service or education for
any reason whatsoever." 8
In 1975, the EHA, the first iteration of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, became law. 9 At this time, the legacy of state statutes, like
North Carolina's 1965 statute, remained prevalent. In fact,

s

Id. (emphasis added).
See Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 294-95, 297 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (entering a consent order resolving plaintiffs' claims that exclusion of children with
disabilities from public schools offends constitutional principles of due process and equal
protection and requiring that "[e]very retarded person between the ages of six and twenty-one
years [shall be provided] access to a free public program of education and training appropriate to
his learning capacities" by the state); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876
(D.D.C. 1972) (concluding that public schools may not exclude students merely because they
have been labeled as behaviorally problematic, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, or
hyperactive because "[d]efendants are required by the Constitution of the United States . . to
provide a publicly-supported education for these 'exceptional' children" and "[flailure to fulfill
this clear duty to include and retain these children in the public school system . .. cannot be
excused").
Pa. Ass' for Retarded Children, 343 F. Supp. at 303. The language used to identify
children with disabilities has changed significantly over time. This Article retains original
language in quoted text, but it otherwise attempts to use modern terminology. Today, "person
first" language is standard. The United States Supreme Court even recognized recently that
"mental retardation" is an outdated characterization of a person with an intellectual disability and
that it would not use that outdated term in its current opinions. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.
1986, 1990 (2014) ("Previous opinions of this Court have employed the term 'mental
retardation.' This opinion uses the term 'intellectual disability' to describe the identical
phenomenon.").
8
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1293, § 2, http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/Session
Laws/HTML/1973-1974/SLl973-1293.html (codifying "An Act to Establish Equal Educational
Opportunities in the Public Schools; and For Other Purposes," effective July 1, 1974).
9
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (2011)).
6
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congressional studies [at the time] revealed that better than half
of the Nation's 8 million disabled children were not receiving
appropriate educational services. Indeed, one out of every eight
of these children was excluded from the public school system
altogether, many others were simply "warehoused" in special
classes or were neglectfully shepherded through the system
until they were old enough to drop out.1 o
The EHA affirmatively addressed the oppressive objectives of North
Carolina's 1965 statute and others like it across the country. This landmark
legislation established substantive and procedural rights in favor of children
with disabilities and their parents.
Substantively, the EHA codified the right of children with disabilities
to receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE)." This ended any notion,
like that reflected in North Carolina's former 1965 legislation, that such
children "shall not be permitted to attend public schools."l 2
Procedurally, the EHA provided parents with extensive notice and "due
process" rights, empowering them to participate in their children's education
and to enforce the rights established by the Act.1 3 This ended the notion,
previously codified in North Carolina's 1965 legislation, that parental
participation in the education of their children with disabilities was criminal
and appropriate for punishment.
Congress has revisited the terms of this landmark legislation, now
renamed and known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA),1 4 multiple times since its original passage.' 5 In each reauthorization, it
10

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 596-97 (1988).

1
See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2013) (establishing as one purpose for the Act "to
ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education"); id. § 1401(9) (defining a "free appropriate public education" for purposes of the
Act); 34 C.F.R. § 300.17 (2015) (detailing the meaning of a "free appropriate public education");
id. §§ 300.101-.113 (specifying the requirements that states must satisfy in order to be compliant
with their obligation to provide a free appropriate public education to eligible children with
disabilities under the IDEA).
12
1965 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 584, § 17, http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/sessionlaws/
html/1965-1966/ si1965-584.html.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (making clear that states "shall establish and maintain
13
procedures . . . to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed
procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education"); see
also id. § 1415(b)-(o) (detailing the procedural protections required by the IDEA); 34 C.F.R. §§
300.501, 300.516 (same).
14
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat.
1103 (1990) (re-naming the legislation the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). It
warrants noting that the 2004 revisions to the IDEA characterized the reauthorized legislation as
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA). See Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (2009)). As a result, some now refer to this legislation as
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has retained or strengthened the Act's fundamental goal to improve educational
outcomes for children with disabilities through substantive and procedural
protections for those children and their parents. 16
Today, children's rights to attend public schools, regardless of their
abilities, and parents' rights to partici ate in their children's education are well
established in federal 17 and state law.
This Article focuses on one of the fundamental procedural rights
guaranteed by the IDEA: the right to an "impartial due process hearing." Both
federal and state law now guarantee children with disabilities and their
parents' 9 a right to an administrative "impartial due process hearing," 2 0
conducted expeditiously, through which they may challenge "any matter
relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child,
or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child," 2 1 or the
discipline of such child.22

IDEIA or the 2004 Reauthorization. For purposes of this Article, it will be referred to as the
IDEA, the acronym established for this legislation in 1990 with the passage of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1990.
15
See Lisa Lukasik, Asperger's Syndrome and Eligibility Under the IDEA: Eliminating the
Emerging "FailureFirst"Requirement to Prevent a Good IDEA from Going Bad, 19 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 252, 259-62 (2011) (detailing this legislative development).
16
See id. at 260-61.
1
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (identifying the purposes of the federal legislation as, inter
alia, "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living"; "to ensure
that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected"; and "to
assist States, localities, and educational service agencies, and Federal agencies to provide for the
education of all children with disabilities").
18
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.2(a) (2015) ("The purposes of this Article are to (i)
ensure that all children with disabilities ages three through 21 who reside in this State have
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepares them for further education,
employment, and independent living; (ii) ensure that the rights of these children and their parents
are protected; and (iii) enable the State Board of Education and local agencies to provide for the
education of all children with disabilities.").
19
Parents may enjoy this right only until their child with a disability reaches a state's age of
majority unless the parent secures legal guardianship of a child who has been determined to be
incompetent or has been appropriately appointed to represent the educational interests of the
child under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.2.
20
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (guaranteeing that "[w]henever a complaint has been received
under subsection (b)(6) or (k), the parents or the local educational agency involved in such
complaint shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing"); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-109.6 (guaranteeing that "[any party may file with the Office of Administrative
Hearings a petition to request an impartial hearing").
21
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (identifying the substance upon which parties may file a
complaint leading to an "impartial due process hearing"); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
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In recent years, scrutiny of this procedural right has increased. 23
Academics have begun to compile data from a handful of states to develop an
empirical foundation upon which to build a meaningful dialogue regarding its
strengths and weaknesses. 24 To date, however, there has been no empirical

109.6(a) (identifying the substance upon which parties may file a petition for an "impartial
hearing" in North Carolina).
22
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(H), (k)(3) (guaranteeing that the procedural rights afforded
to
children with disabilities and their parents extend to situations in which a child with a disability is
removed from his public educational placement as part of school discipline); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-109.6(a) (including "manifestation determinations" done in connection with
decisions regarding the discipline of a child with disabilities within the list of matters available
for "impartial due process hearings").
23
See, e.g., Jasmine E. Harris, ProcessingDisability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (2015)
(examining the consequences of the legal practice to hold private, rather than public, adjudicatory
proceedings in matters involving the rights of persons with disabilities and considering specialeducation due-process proceedings as an illustrative example); Eloise Pasachoff, Special
Education, Poverty, and the Limits ofPrivateEnforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1414
(2011) (arguing that the private enforcement mechanism in the IDEA leads to "predictable
disparities in enforcement in favor of wealthier beneficiaries as opposed to poor beneficiaries");
Geoffrey F. Schultz & Joseph R. McKinney, Special Education Due Process: Hearing Officer
Background and Case Variable Effects on Decisions Outcomes, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17, 17
(reviewing the effect of hearing officer background on case outcomes); Mark C. Weber, In
Defense of IDEA Due Process, 29 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. ON RESOL. 459, 523 (2014) (acknowledging
the national debate about due-process proceedings, defending them, and identifying meaningful
modifications to improve the process overall); Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for
Denials of FAPE Under the IDEA, 33 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214, 221 (2013)
(examining decisions published in Special Ed Connection to identify the frequency of particular
outcomes achieved through the IDEA's administrative process in cases establishing a violation of
FAPE); Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process HearingSystems Under the IDEA: A Stateby-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 3, 3-8 (2010) (offering an overview of the types
of due-process systems employed across the country and how those systems are operated).
24

See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUALS

WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 137-216 (N.Y. Press 2013) (considering outcomes in Ohio,

Florida, New Jersey, California, and the District of Columbia); Ruth Colker, Special Education
Complaint Resolution: Ohio, 29 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 371, 371-74 (2014) (identifying
outcomes in Ohio's special-education complaint proceedings and comparing them to outcomes in
that state's due-process proceedings); Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Hearing Officers:
Balance and Bias, 24 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 67 (2013) (identifying outcomes of a five-state
study of administrative decisions in special-education cases in California, Connecticut, Florida,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey); Perry A. Zirkel, JudicialAppeals for Hearing/Review Officer
Decisions Under IDEA: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 78 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 375, 379 (2012)
(analyzing 65 hearing officer decisions issued between 1982 and 2010 to identify outcome
trends); Cali Cope-Kasten, Note, Bidding (Fair)Well to Due Process: The Need for a Fairer
Final State in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 501, 522 (2013) (offering
data on this process in Wisconsin and Minnesota); MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY INTHE
DUE PROCESS SYSTEM: ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS, 1997-

2002, at 7 (2002), http://dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf (identifying outcomes in Illinois).
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analysis of these statutorily guaranteed administrative "impartial due process
hearings" in North Carolina. This Article begins that study. 25
It examines administrative law judge (ALJ) decisions in North
Carolina's "first-tier" impartial due-process hearings. This Article draws its
data from the complete, available body of North Carolina AU decisions
resolving special-education complaints filed between January 2000 and
December 2012.26
In Part II, this Article provides background on North Carolina's unique
implementation of the federal obligation to provide administrative "impartial
due process hearings." It also explains the source of and limitations on the body
of ALJ decisions considered along with the methodology used to analyze those
decisions.
Part III presents foundational data drawn from an analysis of 12 years
of written ALJ decisions following due-process hearings in North Carolina's
special-education cases. It considers several widely debated changes in the law
to measure their impact, if any, on outcomes in these hearings. Some of the
statistical data uncovered refutes intuitive conceptions about how judicial
decisions and legislative changes in the law influence outcomes at this stage.
Part IV compiles and presents data beyond the foundation introduced in
Part III. It reports what actually happened, historically, in these hearings,
eliminating the need to rely on anecdotal evidence in discussions about the
effectiveness of this process. The data presented here includes statistics
addressing, for example, which party most often initiated those proceedings,
whether they were initiated more frequently in urban or rural counties, whether
the parties were pro se or represented by legal counsel, and how frequently
petitioners found success overall and under specified circumstances.27
Finally, this Article concludes by recognizing that additional research
remains to be done to build on the initial empirical results presented here.

North Carolina has a two-tiered impartial administrative process. This Article publishes
data on the first tier of these proceedings. An article offering an empirical analysis of the second
tier is in progress.
26
See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text (explaining how the Author obtained the
AL decisions considered through public records requests and acknowledging the possibility that
gaps exist).
27
See infra Part IV. Success (or failure) in the first-tier proceedings examined in this study
does not equate to success (or failure) at large. The decisions examined here may be appealed to
an administrative review office (for the second-tier review) before being appealed further to
federal or state court. First-tier decisions may be overturned at any subsequent step in the
process. A prevailing party at the first tier may end up "losing" on appeal. A failing party at the
first tier may find "success" on appeal.
25

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss2/7

8

Lukasik: Special-Education Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of North Caro
SPECIAL-EDUCA TION LITIGATION

2015 ]

743

As a State Hearing Review Officer, 2 8 the Author does not advocate for
any particular normative understanding of North Carolina's first-tier hearing
procedure or the IDEA generally based upon the statistical analysis provided.29
Instead, the Author and this Article simply contribute by providing previously
unavailable and unexamined descriptive data.
This Article does, however, reach two irrefutable conclusions. First,
North Carolina's first-tier "informal due process hearing" procedure represents
progress. It embodies a complete reversal from the state's criminal treatment of
parental involvement in the education of their children with disabilities 40
years ago. Further, parents' representation by an attorney stands out among all
factors analyzed, including factors associated with specific changes in the law,
as the one correlating most significantly with positive parental outcomes in
first-tier special-education hearings.3 0
II. NORTH CAROLINA'S SPECIAL-EDUCATION LITIGATION: BACKGROUND

AND BEGINNINGS
Before reporting the statistical data derived from this study of North
Carolina's first-tier decisions in special-education litigation, this Article
presents necessary background. This Part offers an overview of the federal and
state law governing the structure of the hearings. It then explains the
methodology used to collect and evaluate the decisions examined.
A.

Background on North Carolina's Unique Two-Tiered Administrative
Process

The IDEA requires states to provide an expeditious administrative
review of complaints regarding the education of children with disabilities. But
it allows states some flexibility in determining how to satisfy that obligation.

28
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.9 (2015) (authorizing State Hearing Review Officers and
explaining their role in resolving due-process complaints in second-tier administrative hearings
on appeal following issuance of written tier-one decisions, like those considered in this Article).
29
To be clear, the data presented here may provoke particular ponderings about the
effectiveness of existing laws protecting the relatively newly recognized right of children with
disabilities to access free appropriate public education. This Article specifically does not suggest
or encourage any particular resolution to such ideas. Instead, the purpose of this publication is
simpler. It seeks only to open a window to previously shuttered factual data about North
Carolina's special-education litigation at its inception and in its early administrative stages.
30
See infra Part IV.A.3 (offering the data on the correlation between parental representation
and hearing outcomes). Because school systems (both traditional and charter) were represented
by attorneys in all tier-one hearings considered in this analysis, this data pool offered no control
group without representation against which to compare school-system outcomes based upon the

representation variable.
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North Carolina employs a unique, but permissible,3 1 means to satisfy the
federal requirement for "impartial due process hearings" in this context.
The IDEA guarantees parents and school systems access to "an
impartial due process hearing" to resolve disputes over the identification and
evaluation of children with disabilities and the provision of FAPE. 32 The IDEA
further provides that these impartial due-process hearings "shall be conducted
[1] by the State educational agency or [2] by the local educational agency, as
determined by State law." 3 3 Participation in the state's selected due-process
hearing procedure begins litigation in special-education disputes.
Depending upon whether a state opts to conduct its initial
administrative review through a local educational agency or the state
educational agency, the IDEA may impose additional requirements on the
process.
If a state opts to authorize "the local educational agency to conduct the
[initial] due process hearing, [the state] must provide" an opportunity for parties
to appeal that decision to the state educational agency.34 On the other hand, if
the state educational agency conducts the initial due-process proceeding, no
administrative appeal is required.
The former structure, in which special-education litigation begins with
a hearing before a local educational agency followed by an administrative
appeal to a state educational agency, is often referred to as a "two-tiered
system." This is because, in the usual case, it requires a "second-tier"
administrative review before the state board of education.
The latter structure, in which special education begins in a hearing
before the state board of education, is commonly characterized as a "single31
See E.L. ex rel. Lorsson v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 773 F.3d 509, 515-16 (4th
Cir. 2014) (holding that North Carolina's two-tiered administrative process is permissible under
the IDEA); O.M. ex rel. McWhirter v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09-CV-692, 2013 WL
664900, at *11 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2013) (concluding that North Carolina's two-tiered
administrative process is permissible under the IDEA); L.K. ex rel. Henderson v. N.C. State Bd.
of Educ., No. 5:08-CV-85-BR, 2010 WL 3239091, at *6 (E.D.N.C. June 23, 2010) (noting that
correspondence from the United States Office of Special Educational Programs indicates that the
federal Department of Education participated in the development of North Carolina's two-tiered
administrative process and approved of it).
32
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2013); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(a) (2015).
3
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.511(b) (providing
also that the impartial due-process hearing required by the Act "must be conducted by the SEA
[State Educational Agency] or the public agency directly responsible for the education of the
child, as determined under State statute, State regulation, or a written policy of the SEA").
34
Wittenberg v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:05CV00818, 2006 WL
2568937, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2006) (emphases added); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1).
3s
20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (remaining silent regarding any administrative appeal required in
states whose state boards of education conduct the initial due-process hearing); see also
Wittenberg, 2006 WL 2568937, at *2 ("If the state elects to allow the local educational agency to
conduct the due process hearing, it must provide for an appeal to the state educational agency.").
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tiered system." This is because it requires no federally mandated "second-tier"
administrative review.
Most jurisdictions employ the single-tiered system.3 6 In fact, 42 states,
plus the District of Columbia, employ a single-tiered administrative process. 37
Only eight states require a two-tiered administrative process. Of the
eight states with a two-tiered process, not all operate like North Carolina, where
both the initial hearing and the administrative review are before state officers.
36

See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-8-9.08 (2015); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 52.550

(2015); ARIz. ADMIN. CODE § R7-2-405 (2015); ARK. CODE R. § 005.18.31-4 (LexisNexis 2015);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 60550 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-20-108 (2015); CONN. AGENCIES
REGS. § 10-76h-16 (2015); 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 926 (2015); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5-E, § 3031
(2015); FLA. STAT. § 1003.57 (2015); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-4-7.12 (2015); HAW. CODE R. §
8-60-68 (LexisNexis 2015); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 08.02.03.109 (2015); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5 / 14-8.02a (2015); 511 IND. ADMIN. CODE 7-45-9 (2015); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 28141.514 (2015); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, pt. XLIII, § 514 (2015); 05-071, Ch. 101 ME. CODE R. §
XVI (LexisNexis 2015); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.05.01.15 (2015); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 28.08
(2015); MICH. ADMIN. Code r. 340.1724f (2015); MINN. R. 3525.4770 (2015); 7-4 Miss. CODE R.
§ 1:300.514 (LexisNexis 2015); Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 5, § 20-300.110 (2015); MONT.
ADMIN. R. 10.16.3523 (2015); 92 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 55-009 (2015); N.H. CODE R. EDUC.
1123.20 (2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §1:6A-18.3 (2015); N.M. CODE R. § 6.31.2 (LexisNexis
2015); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 67-23-05-01 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 343.175 (2015); 22 PA. CODE §
16.63 (2015); 21-2-54:E R.I. CODER. § 300.514 (LexisNexis 2015); S.D. ADMIN. R. 24:05:30:11
(2015); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0520-01-09-.19 (2015); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1185
(2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-15-305 (LexisNexis 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2957 (West
2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-214 (2015); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-05115 (2015); W.
VA. CODE R. § 126-16-11.4 (2015); Wis. STAT. § 115.80 (2015); 7 WYo. CODE R. § 7
(LexisNexis 2015); see also Weber, supra note 23, at 513 (noting a "trend in the states away
from two-tier (hearing and decision and then review officer proceeding) system to one-tier
processes").
3
See supra note 36 (offering citations to all 43 statutes providing single-tier due-process
review proceedings in special-education cases); see also Larson v. Int'l Falls Pub. Sch., No. Civ.

02-3611, 2002 WL 31108199, at *5 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2002) ("[T]he Court notes that the notion
that the [Minnesota] IHO level of review is local is a legal fiction."); Wittenberg, 2006 WL
2568937, at *4 n.4. But see T.H. v. Bd. of Educ., 55 F. Supp. 2d 830, 845 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
("[T]he text of the Illinois statute which governed IDEA proceedings at the time of [the child's]
IEP reveals that both the Level I and Level II hearings are 'state level' hearings.").
38
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-974(b)(l)-(b)(1)(A) (2015) ("Any party to a due process
hearing provided for under this act may appeal the decision to the state board by filing a written
notice of appeal . . .. A review officer appointed by the state board shall conduct an impartial
review of the decision."); 707 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:340.12(1) (2015) ("A party to a due process
hearing that is aggrieved by the hearing decision may appeal the decision to members of the
Exceptional Children Appeals Board as assigned by the Kentucky Department of Education.");
NEv. ADMIN. CODE § 388.315 (2015) ("A party may appeal from the decision of a hearing
officer .. . [and] a state review officer appointed by the Superintendent from a list of officers
maintained by the Department shall conduct an impartial review of the hearing."); N.Y. EDUc.
LAW § 4404(1)(c) (McKinney 2015) ("The decision of the impartial hearing officer shall be
binding upon both parties unless appealed to the state review officer."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C109.9(a) (2015) ("Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision of a hearing officer ... may
appeal the findings .... The State Board, through the Exceptional Children Division, shall
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The two-tiered system in North Carolina is unique because both tiers of
administrative review are before a state, not local, authority. North Carolina
does not authorize a local educational agency to render an initial decision.
Instead, it authorizes the Office of Administrative Hearings 40 to deploy a stateemployed, specially trained 41 administrative law judge (ALJ) to the county in
which the dispute arose to resolve the first-tier hearing.4 2 Then, it requires
parties to appeal adverse ALJ decisions to a review officer appointed by the
state board of education4 3 before filing further appeal in federal or state court.44

appoint a Review Officer from a pool of review officers .. . [who] shall conduct an impartial
review .... ); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.05(3)(h) (LexisNexis 2015) ("A party to a
hearing ... shall be accorded . .. [ajn opportunity . . . to appeal . .. to the state board, which shall
appoint a state level officer who shall review the case and issue a final order."); OKLA. ADMIN.
CODE § 210:15-13-5(a) (2015) ("All Hearing and Appeal Officers assigned by the Oklahoma
State Department of Education . .. are expected to remain impartial in discharging their
responsibilities at all times."); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243(15)(b)(1) (2015) ("If the hearing
required by Sec. 300.511 is conducted by a public agency other than the SEA, any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision in the hearing may appeal to the SEA. If there is an
appeal, the SEA must conduct an impartial review. . . .").
3
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 43-243(15)(b)(1) ("If the hearing required by Sec.
300.511 is conducted by a public agency other than the SEA, any party aggrieved by the findings
and decision in the hearing may appeal to the SEA. If there is an appeal, the SEA must conduct
an impartial review ..... (emphasis added)).
40
"The Office of Administrative Hearings is an independent, quasi-judicial agency under
Article III, Sec. 11 of the [North Carolina] Constitution. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750. Parties
initiating due-process proceedings in special-education litigation do so by filing a petition with
the Office of Administrative Hearings. § 1 15C-109.6.
41
See Memorandum of Understanding from the N.C. State Bd. of Educ., through the Dep't
of Pub. Instruction, Exceptional Children Div. to the N.C. Office of Admin. Hearings, at 3 (Nov.
27, 2006) (on file with the West Virginia Law Review). This Memorandum of Understanding
requires the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) to "provide and pay tuition and costs for
IDEA training to special education ALJs [administrative law judges] designated by the Chief
Administrative Law Judge." Id. It further requires that the "DPI will review with the Chief ALJ,
on a yearly basis, the ongoing special education training needs of ALJs. ALJs hearing special
education cases will be required to participate annually in IDEA training updates and are strongly
encouraged to attend [other trainings]." Id. The Office of Administrative Hearings "will not
appoint temporary ALJs," who have not been specially trained, "to conduct special education
hearings." Id. at 4.
42
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-109.6.
43
See id. § 1 15C-109.9(a)-(b). Although typically decisions of ALJs are not appealed in this
manner, the state administrative procedures act in Chapter 150B makes clear that appeal rights
provided within it do not apply to special-education litigation. Chapter 150B provides that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, timelines and other procedural safeguards
required to be provided under IDEA and Article 9 of Chapter 115C of the General Statutes must
be followed in an impartial due process hearing initiated when a petition is filed under G.S.
115C-109.6 with the Office of Administrative Hearings." Id. § 150B-22.1(a) (emphasis added).
In other words, the only appeals process for first-tier ALJ decisions in North Carolina's specialeducation disputes is the one established by Chapter 115C and particular to special-education
litigation.
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As the Federal District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
summarized,

.

North Carolina has a two-tiered administrative process. At the
first tier, "any party may file with the Office of Administrative
Hearings [('OAH')] a petition to request an impartial hearing
with respect to any matter relating to the provision of a [FAPE]
of a child[.]" The OAH then selects an Administrative Law
Judge ("AL") who [conducts the hearing "in the county where
the child attends school or is entitled to enroll in school. .
unless the parties mutually agree" otherwise ... and] "issue[s]
a written decision[.]" At the second tier, "[a]ny party aggrieved
by the findings and decision of a hearing officer ... may
appeal ... by filing a written notice of appeal with the person
designated by the State Board." At that point, "[t]he State
Board ...
appoint[s] a Review Officer [("SRO") to] ...
conduct an impartial review of the findings and decision
appealed ...
[and] make an independent decision upon
completion of the review."45

Once the State Review Officer renders a decision, under both federal
and North Carolina law, either party to the dispute may institute a civil action

4
See id. § 115C-109.9(d). Interestingly, not all decisions studied in this research accurately
reflect this administrative process. Some ALJ decisions incorrectly state that parties may appeal
these decisions either to superior court pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 150B, the judicial review
procedures of North Carolina's Administrative Procedure Act, or in federal court under the
IDEA. Other ALJ decisions reflect the law that parties may appeal these decisions by filing
notice of appeal with the State Board of Education under Article 9 of Chapter 115C, North
Carolina's legislation on the education of children with disabilities.
45
O.M. ex rel. McWhirter v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1: 09-CV-692, 2013 WL
664900, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2013) (some alterations in original) (internal citations
omitted); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(l)-(2) (2013) (requiring the procedural safeguards notice
and detailing its contents and distribution); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 (2015) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-109.1 ("The State Board of Education shall make available to parents a handbook of
procedural safeguards. This handbook for parents shall be made available at least once each
school year, except that a copy also shall be given to a parent [upon initial referral, parental
request, or other significant moments in the special-education process, and] 'shall include a full
explanation' [of key special-education rights and procedural requirements]... . The State Board
shall place a current copy of the handbook for parents on its Internet Web site."); PUB. SCHs. OF
N.C., PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS: HANDBOOK ON PARENTS' RIGHTS 18 (2009), http://ec.ncpublic
schools.gov/parent-resources/ecparenthandbook.pdf ("A decision made in a due process
hearing ... is final, unless appealed. Either party involved in the hearing (you [parent] or the
LEA [local educational agency]) may appeal the decision to the EC [Exceptional Children]
Division within 30 days of receipt of the decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings. In
other words . .. [i]f you [parent] disagree with the judge's decision in a due process hearing, you
may appeal it to the EC Division within 30 days of receiving the decision.").
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in federal or state court. 46 This civil action then proceeds as any other civil
action instituted in federal or state court. Only a minority of cases, however, are
litigated beyond North Carolina's administrative two-tiered due-process
procedure.
The analysis presented here addresses written ALJ decisions issued
following the first-tier due-process hearings in those cases in which complaints
were initiated between January 2000 and December 2012.
B. Explanation ofDecisionAcquisition, Study Methodology, andInherent
Limitations on the Analysis
The statistical data offered in this Article derives from an analysis of 97
North Carolina ALJ decisions resolving special-education due-process
complaints filed in the years 2000 through 2012. These decisions comprise all
North Carolina tier-one decisions over the covered period available in print or
electronic resources or via public records requests.

47

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2013) (establishing the right to "bring a civil action ... in
any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard
to the amount in controversy" once the administrative process has run its course); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-109.9(d) (identifying a right to appeal "the decision of the Review Officer" in a
civil action in state or federal court).
47
The Author believes she has collected all written ALJ decisions publicly available. She
has everything available in print or through electronic resources, and she has all she can acquire
via records requests from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (DPI). On March
11, 2013, Ms. Lynn Smith, Dispute Resolution Consultant with the North Carolina Department
of Public Instruction, indicated that the materials she had provided were "close to covering the
cases" in our request, but that she still needed to provide "review decisions and would like to
send ... the federal case numbers." E-mail from Lynn Smith, Dispute Resolution Consultant,
Exceptional Children Div., N.C. Dep't of Public Instruction, to Lisa Lukasik, Assistant Professor
of Law, Campbell Law (Mar. 11, 2013, 17:10 EST) (on file with the West Virginia Law Review)
(suggesting that all first-tier decisions had been provided and that only second-tier, review officer
decisions remained outstanding). On March 25, 2013, Ms. Smith delivered what she believed to
be the final batch of "review officer decisions" or second-tier decisions, and wrote that "[t]o the
best of my knowledge, this is all the decisions." E-mail from Lynn Smith, Dispute Resolution
Consultant, Exceptional Children Div., N.C. Dep't of Public Instruction, to Lisa Lukasik,
Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell Law (Mar. 25, 2013, 19:01 EST) (on file with the West
Virginia Law Review). At that time, the Author believed she had received all first and second-tier
decisions over the covered period. As she reviewed the decisions, however, she identified a
handful of cases that she believed were missing. She presented those case numbers at
conferences in 2014 and early 2015, where school-system administrators, parents of children
with disabilities, and school attorneys were present, seeking information from outside the
Department of Public Instruction to locate the "missing" decisions. Because Lynn Smith retired
in October 2013, the Author also corresponded with Mr. Bill Elvey, another Consultant with the
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction. On April 3, 2014, Mr. Elvey indicated that he
could not find the first-tier decisions the Author identified as missing from her collection, but he
found one review officer decision with a citation to one of the missing first-tier decisions. E-mail
from Bill Elvey, Dispute Resolution Consultant, Exceptional Children Div., N.C. Dep't of Pub.
Instruction, to Lisa Lukasik, Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell Law (Apr. 3, 2014 13:05
46
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This section of the Article highlights the federal and state laws
requiring ALJ decisions in special-education due-process proceedings to be
made available to the public. It also acknowledges the practical inaccessibility
of these decisions. It then details the means by which the Author acquired the
decisions considered, the methodology used to analyze their outcomes, and the
inherent limitations on the results of this study.
1. Decision Acquisition
Under the United States Code, ALJ decisions in special-education
proceedings "shall be made available to the public." 4 8 The IDEA expressly
requires this as a "safeguard" against impropriety. 49 North Carolina recognizes
this federal requirement in its special-education policies. These policies require
that the "SEA [State Educational Agency], after deleting any personally
identifiable information, must . .. [m]ake [special-education due-process]
findings and decisions available to the public.",s
Neither federal law nor North Carolina's special-education policies
specify when or where administrative findings and decisions must be made
available to the public. They are difficult to find.
ALJ decisions in North Carolina's special-education due-process
proceedings are not published in any print compilation. This means they are not
bound together in books on shelves in libraries. They are not available in
traditional online legal research databases containing other decisions of the
North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings.5' Even a paid subscription

EST) (on file with the West Virginia Law Review). Thus, although it is possible that some firsttier decisions may remain missing from the Author's set, those decisions are not available at the
time of this publication, either online, through records requests, or from any print or electronic
database containing such administrative decisions.
48
20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4)(A) (2013) (requiring that all findings and decisions shall be made
available to the public consistent with the requirements of § 1417(b), relating to the
confidentiality of student data, information, and records).
49

Id.

PUB. SCHS. OF N.C., POLICIES GOVERNING SERVICES FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES §
1504.1.14(d)(2) (2014) [hereinafter N.C. POLICIES], http://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/policies/ncpolicies-goveming-services-for-children-with-disabilities/policies-children-disabilities.pdf
(requiring publication of ALJ decisions after a first-tier review); id. § 1504.1.15(c)(2) (requiring
publication of state hearing officer decisions after a second-tier review).
51
"The Office of Administrative Hearings is an independent, quasi-judicial agency under
Article III, Sec. 11 of the [North Carolina] Constitution. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-750. Parties
initiating due-process proceedings in special-education litigation do so by filing a petition with
the Office of Administrative Hearings. Id. § 115C-109.6. Although both Westlaw and Lexis
contain databases with decisions rendered by ALJs in the Office of Administrative Hearings,
neither of those databases contains special-education decisions rendered by ALJs pursuant to
North Carolina General Statute section 115 C- 109.6.
50
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to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report52 or Special Ed.
Connection5 3 does not provide all of North Carolina's ALJ decisions in specialeducation due-process proceedings.5 4
In the past, North Carolina's State Board of Education has published a
smattering of ALJ decisions in special-education cases on its website, but it has
never posted all of them. In fact, throughout the period of this study, the State
Board of Education's website never posted any of the ALJ decisions for many
of the years covered (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2012). 5s As of the date
of publication, the page that previously held some of the decisions over the
covered period had been updated to erase those decisions and include only
decisions from years beyond the reach of this study, 2014 and 2015.56
The Author obtained the decisions considered in this Article over a
three-year period through the cooperation of the Department of Public
Instruction's Exceptional Children Division. At the time the Author's records
requests began, many requested decisions had not been redacted to protect the
children's confidentiality as required by federal" and state law.5 8 Now that
these decisions have been redacted, they may eventually appear on the State
Board of Education's website. All decisions considered in this study are
available on Campbell Law's Scholarly Repository.5 9
The analysis presented here reports the results observed through a
systematic analysis of all presently available first-tier ALJ decisions in North
Carolina's special-education due-process proceedings in cases filed from
January 2000 through December 2012. This data set includes 97 ALJ decisions

52
Individuals with Disabilities Education Law Report, LRP PUBLICATIONS, http://www.
shoplrp.com/product-p/300001.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
53
SPECIAL ED CONNECTION, http://www.specialedconnection.com/LrpSecStoryTool/splash.
jsp (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
54
While some of North Carolina's ALJ decisions in special-education decisions are available
in these resources, many are missing. This Author compiled additional decisions not available in
these resources through public records requests.
55
Hearing Decisions, PUB. SCHS. OF N.C., http://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/parent-resources/
dispute-resolution/due-process-hearings/hearing-decisions (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
56

Id.

57
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4)(A) (2013) (providing that decisions "shall be made available
to the public consistent with the requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b)" (relating to the
confidentiality of data, information, and records)); id. § 1417(b)-(c) (prohibiting disclosure of
confidential information, including "any personally identifiable data, information, and records"
for a particular child); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(d) (2015) (requiring publication of hearing officer
decisions "after deleting any personally identifiable information").
58
See N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, § 1504-1.14(d) (requiring that the State Educational
Agency (SEA) must make hearing officer decisions public only "after deleting any personally
identifiable information").
5
Scholarly Repository, CAMPBELL LAW, http://scholarship.law.campbell.eduloah/ (last
visited Nov. 5, 2015).
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resolving cases filed throughout the covered period. The following table
reflects the number of cases initiated and litigated through first-tier review in
each year throughout the period studied.

Cases Filed Per Year
14
12
10
6

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2008 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

The remainder of this section explains the methodology used to analyze
these decisions and the inherent limitations on the results of that analysis.
2. Research Goals and Methodology
Many forms of empirical research are available to investigate targeted
subjects or phenomena. The analytical approach depends in large part upon the
study's objectives. The two primary objectives of this research did, in fact,
determine the empirical methods utilized here.
This research initially sought to discover what actually happens in the
proceedings studied. For example, how many special-education due-process
complaints are, in fact, pressed through to a hearing annually? Has the rate
changed as a result of changes in the law? What is the rate at which ALJs
resolve these disputes in favor of parent petitioners versus school-system
petitioners? Does this rate change by county, parties' representation status,
disability of the child at issue, number of issues raised, or some other
identifiable factor? What is the rate at which parents, as opposed to school
systems, initiate due-process proceedings and press them through to final
written decision? This study was designed to enable the Author to report this
type of observable outcome data to establish a factual foundation for further
dialogue about the strengths and weaknesses of the procedural process provided
to parties in special-education disputes in North Carolina and across the
country.
The second primary goal of this research was to compile data about the
relation that particular variables might have to outcomes in first-tier due-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 7
752

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

process proceedings in North Carolina. This study sought to establish the
strength of correlations between particular variables to provide meaningful
context about the observations reported.
Given this study's primary purposes to discover what is actually
happening in North Carolina's first-tier due-process proceedings, and to
identify particular variables that coordinate highly with particular outcomes or
changes in outcomes, the Author relied upon two principal empirical methods.
First, the Author utilized an Excel spreadsheet to code all ALJ
decisions studied, recording facts in each case on a number of significant
variables. The coded variables included, inter alia, the identity of petitioner
(parent or school system), the identity of respondent, parties' representation
status (pro se or represented), the type of public school (traditional or charter),
county of origin, the identity of the prevailing party, the type of disability of the
child whose education was at issue, the age of the child whose education was at
issue, the number of issues addressed by the ALJ, the number of witnesses
presented by each party, whether the case was resolved on a procedural or
substantive ground, the identity of the presiding ALJ, and the attorney of record
for each party (if any). Once all of the decisions were coded, the Author
grouped decisions based on select variables and combinations of variables to
identify the outcomes reported.
Second, once the Author accumulated foundational data pursuant to the
Excel analysis described above, three principal statistical measures were
utilized to evaluate that data. Pearson's Chi-squared test determined the
statistical significance of particular independent variables on outcomes
identified. Pearson's product-moment coefficient identified the strength of
correlation between particular variables. Finally, when evaluating the influence
of multiple dependent variables simultaneously on outcomes in first-tier
decisions, the Author used a multiple linear regression analysis.
3. Limitations Inherent in Study Methodology and Results
Research of the type reported here is subject to inherent limitations.
This Article addresses them as they become significant to particular
discussions. Two fundamental limitations, however, warrant recognition up
front.
First, nothing about the data reported here offers any explanation of the
merits of any particular case or of any group of cases. Whether petitioners bring
meritorious complaints cannot be determined through this study. Additionally,
whether ALJs resolve these complaints properly on the facts presented cannot
be determined through this study. Thus, for example, the finding that parent
petitioners rarely prevail when they proceed pro se does not provide any insight
about whether pro se parent petitioners have meritorious complaints or whether
ALJs resolve those complaints correctly on the facts presented.
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Second, this study does not include special-education due-process
complaints that are resolved short of a written ALJ decision via settlement60 or
that are pursued through the State's investigatory complaint process. 6 1 Thus,

this study cannot determine whether consideration of complaints resolved
under those circumstances would somehow illuminate the outcomes observed
through this study.62
With this background and these caveats, this Article next discusses the
foundational data drawn from these decisions.
III. EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS: CHANGES IN THE LAW AND THEIR IMPACT ON
TIER-ONE HEARING FREQUENCY AND OUTCOMES

The United States Government Accountability Office recently reported
a general nationwide decline in the number of special-education "due process"
cases pressed forward to a full, written decision. 3 Other analysts have
identified increases in particular contexts.6 4 As the search for data on the

60
The Department of Public Instruction publishes some data about aggregate numbers of
mediations requested, but this Author did not have access to the complaints inspiring those
mediations or the outcomes of those mediations, and they are not included in this study. See Endof-Year Reports, PUB. SCHS. OF N.C., http://ec.ncpublicschools.gov/ec/parent-resources/disputeresolution/end-of-year-reports (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (providing some data about numbers of
special-education mediations).
61
See N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, §§ 1501-10.1-10.3 (adopting a state complaint
procedure to address complaints "filed by an organization or individual from another State"
(even if they are not a parent of a child with a disability) and requiring an "independent on-site
investigation" if necessary); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-53 (requiring that each state receiving funds
under the IDEA must establish written procedures to permit filing complaints directly with the
SEA on behalf of interested organizations and individuals, including non-parents and individuals
and organizations from other states, and ensuring that such complaints are resolved within 60
days including through "an independent on-site investigation" if necessary).
62
See Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An
Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1614 (2001) (noting similar
limitations inherent in an empirical study considering North Carolina ALJ decisions outside the
special-education context).
63
See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SPECIAL EDUCATION: IMPROVED
COULD ENHANCE OVERSIGHT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (2014),
http://gao.gov/assets/670/665434.pdf (noting that most of the reported decline in the number of
special-education cases nationally over the last decade is a result of a decline in the number of
cases in New York, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia); Weber, supra note 23, at 508-09
(noting that according to one source "the latest data [through 2012] show[s] a 10% decline in the
number of hearing requests over the past seven years, and a 58% decline in hearings held").
6
See, e.g., infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (offering the data from North Carolina
reflecting an increase in the number of such cases in this State between 2007 and 2012 when
compared to the period between 2000 and 2005); Perry A. Zirkel, Autism Litigation Under the
IDEA: A New Meaningof "Disproportionality"?,24 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 92, 95 (2011)
(noting the results of a study concluding that the number of special-education cases pressed
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
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prevalence of special-education due-process hearings continues, this Article
offers the first consideration of North Carolina's unique impartial due-process
hearing procedure, the frequency of these hearings in this State, and their
outcomes.65
The North Carolina General Assembly substantially revised the state's
special-education laws in 2006. These revisions included changes that could
impact the number of special-education complaints filed and pressed forward to
a full hearing.
The 2006 amendments, for example, clarified the state's goal with
respect to educating children with disabilities as matching (and not exceeding)
the baseline required by the IDEA;66 incorporated the pre-hearing, state-funded
mediation option introduced by the 2004 amendments to the IDEA; reflected
the 2005 United States Supreme Court decision in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v.
Weast,68 placing the burden of proof in special-education litigation proceedings
on the petitioner, including petitioner parents; and enlarged the applicable
statute of limitations.69
When this research began, the Author selected the particular 12 years
(2000-2012) of study because this period spanned 6 years prior to North

through to a written decision on the issues of FAPE and LRE increased over the 15-year period
studied, from 1993 through 2008).
65
Other academics have begun to empirically examine this process in other states and for
other purposes. See, e.g., COLKER, supra note 24 (examining the shortcomings of the IDEA
through its evolution and effectiveness in Ohio, Florida, New Jersey, California, and the District
of Columbia); Colker, supra note 24 (identifying outcomes in Ohio's special-education
complaint proceedings and comparing them to outcomes in that state's due-process proceedings);
Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Hearing Officers: Balance and Bias, 24 J. DISABILITY POL'Y
STUD. 67 (2012) (evaluating claims of bias in special-education hearing officers and proposing
five factors other than bias that generate disproportionate success for schools over parents).
66
Before the 2006 amendments, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded: "North
Carolina apparently does require more than the [IDEA]. The special education program must
provide the child with an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible, ensuring that
the child has an opportunity to reach her full potential commensurate with the opportunity given
other children." Burke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Denton ex rel. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 983 (4th Cir.
1990). North Carolina's 2006 amendments repealed the statute interpreted by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals and replaced it with new legislation consistent with the standard established in
the IDEA. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1 (2015).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2013) (requiring states to ensure that parties may resolve special6
education "disputes through a mediation process" even "prior to filing of a complaint"); 34
C.F.R. § 300.506 (2015) (affirming and elaborating upon the pre-hearing mediation requirement
in the IDEA).
68
546 U.S. 49, 49 (2005) (holding that under the IDEA, the burden is on the petitioner
challenging an Individualized Education Plan).
69
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6(b) ("Notwithstanding any other law, the party shall file a
petition . . . that sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more than one year before the
party knew or reasonably should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for the
petition.").
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Carolina's 2006 revisions to its special-education laws and 6 years after those
revisions. The Author set out to determine the revisions' effects on the number
of due-process complaints proceeding to a full first-tier hearing resolved
through a written ALJ decision.
This section offers an overview of the 2006 amendments and 2005
Supreme Court decision that prompted the research offered here and then
presents relevant data extracted from the database of catalogued ALJ decisions
included in this study.
A.

Statutory Changes in North Carolina'sSpecial-EducationGoals and
Standard

North Carolina's 2006 special-education amendments repealed former
North Carolina General Statute section 115C-106, which set the previous
special-education goal for the state.
The repealed statute established a state special-education standard
greater than that required by the IDEA. It stated: "The General Assembly of
North Carolina hereby declares that the policy of the State is to ensure every
child a fair and full opportunity to reach his full potential ....
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted this now-repealed
statute and concluded that "North Carolina apparently does require more than
the [IDEA]. The special education program must provide the child with an
equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible, ensuring that the child
has an opportunity to reach her full potential commensurate with the
opportunity given other children." 7 1
The IDEA requires (and has required throughout the period covered by
this study) that in order to be eligible for federal assistance under the Act, each
state must "establish[] a goal of providing full educational opportunity to all
children with disabilities."72 The IDEA does not require (and has never
required) that the state offer a program that would allow each child to "reach
her full potential" or enjoy an "equal opportunity to learn."7
North Carolina's "extra" statutory language about educating to a
child's "full potential" and with "equal opportunity" was repealed from the
2006 N.C. Sess. Laws 69 (repealing former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-106, effective on and
after July 1, 2006).
71
Burke Cty., 895 F.2d at 983.
72
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2).
70

73
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189-200 (1982) (establishing that the EHA
(Education of the Handicapped Act), now renamed the IDEA, contains "no requirement .. . that
States maximize the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportunity
provided to other children"' and "no additional requirement that the services ... provided be
sufficient to maximize each child's potential" or offer "strict equality of opportunity or services,"
but only "the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer
some educational benefit upon the handicapped child").
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North Carolina legislation in 2006 and replaced with language identical to that
found in the IDEA. North Carolina's new legislation asserts: "The goal of the
State is to provide full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities
who reside in the State." 74
This apparent equalization of the standards set by federal and state law
could impact the number of claims asserted and the outcomes of those that
persist through to a written AU decision. Intuitively, one might guess that
following the reduction in the educational standard in North Carolina, parents
would present fewer claims. Why? If we presume parents know the law, as we
must, parents should demand less of public schools following the change in the
law, realizing that their children's entitlement had decreased.
Intuitively, one might also guess that when the educational standard in
North Carolina was reduced to equal the national one, parents would prevail
less often in the claims asserted. Why? The educational entitlement over which
they litigated decreased. 5 Data derived from this study casts some doubt on
these intuitive conclusions.
On the first question, whether the reduction of North Carolina's
educational standard to equal the national one reduces the number of claims
pressed by parents to full hearing, the data counters intuition. This change in
the law did not reduce the number of claims heading to full hearing. Instead,
there was a 22% increase in the number of cases litigated to a final AU
decision in the six-year period after passage of the 2006 amendments as
compared to the six-year period prior to their passage. 77
Although North Carolina's general public school population increased
over this period, the number of children entitled to receive services under the
IDEA did not. Instead, in North Carolina in the years following the 2006
amendments, the number of children between the ages of 3 and 21 entitled to
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.1.
75
One might alternatively hypothesize, of course, that there should be no change in
outcomes under this circumstance because school systems would simply diminish their provision
of services so as to maintain the risk of loss at comparable levels.
74

76

See infra Part IV.A.

n
From 2000 to 2005, there were 41 cases. From 2007 to 2012, there were 50 cases. The rate
of increase = (50-41)/41 = 22%. This calculation treats the year of 2006 as a year of transition
(and does not include the six cases filed that year). This is so for one primary reason: it is
impossible to determine precisely when each case was filed, as no filing date is offered in the
decisions, making it difficult to determine whether each was filed before or after the statutory
change became effective in July 2006. While the decisions often identify when the hearing was
held, they do not indicate precisely when the complaint was filed. Thus, a case heard in August
may have been filed before or after the statutory change became effective. Interestingly, the
number of fully litigated complaints increased between 2006 and 2012, while the number of
North Carolina children eligible for IDEA's protections decreased. See infra note 78 and
accompanying text. Further research beyond the scope of this Article is required to determine the
cause of the increase in the number of fully litigated cases and the decline in the total number of
children served under the IDEA.
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services under the IDEA declined by 2.43% from 192,451 children in 2006 to
187,767 children in 2011.7 In other words, although the total number of
children in public school in North Carolina increased 4.39% from 1,444,481 in
2006 to 1,507,865 in 2011, the most recent year for which this data is
the number of those children who were eligible for special
available,
education under the IDEA decreased.80 Despite the decrease in the relevant
population, the number of special-education cases to proceed through full
hearing increased over that period by 22%.1

See IDEA Section 618 Data Products: State Level Data Files, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
(last
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/osepidea/618-datalstate-level-data-files/index.html#bcc
visited Nov. 5, 2015) [hereinafter State Level Data Files]. Although the total number of North
Carolina children served under the IDEA increased slightly in 2012 over 2011 to 190,098, id.,
there remained an overall decline of 1.22% in the number of children served since 2006. This
Article reports the measure of decline through 2011 in the text above because 2011 is the most
recent year for which the National Center for Educational Statistics has reported comparison data
on the total number of children educated in North Carolina public schools. It is interesting to note
that the number of IDEA-eligible children in North Carolina between 2000 and 2006 increased
by 11.20% from 173,060 in 2000 to 192,451 in 2006. Id. This growth in the number of IDEAeligible children was consistent with the growth in the number of children enrolled in public
schools generally in North Carolina during the period from 2000 through 2006. Over that period,
the number of children enrolled in public schools increased by 11.66% from 1,293,638 in 2000 to
1,444,481 in 2006. See Table 203.20: Enrollment in Public and Secondary Schools by Region,
78

State, and Jurisdiction:Selected Years 1990 Through Fall 2023, DIGEST OF EDUCATION, NAT'L

CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl3/tables/dtl3_203.20.asp (last
visited Sept. 30, 2015) [hereinafter DIGEST STATISTICS].
7
See DIGEST STATISTICS, supra note 78. The National Center for Educational Statistics
projects, but does not offer an accurate count of, the total number of children educated in North
Carolina public schools in 2012. This projection estimates the total number of children educated
in North Carolina public schools in 2012 to be 1,515,700. Id Assuming this projection was
correct, the total number of children educated in North Carolina public schools from 2006
through 2012 increased by 4.93% while the number of IDEA-educated children declined over the
same period by 1.22%, as explained in footnote 78.
80
Other authors have considered the reasons for changes in IDEA eligibility numbers. See,
e.g., Mark Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83 (2009). Such analysis is
beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks only to disclose data regarding first-tier hearings to
inspire further research and normative consideration by others. It is worth recognizing, however,

that North Carolina's decrease in IDEA-eligible students from 2006 to 2011 is consistent with a
national decline in IDEA-eligible students over the same period, despite a slight national increase
in public school enrollment overall. Across the country in 2006, 6,693,279 students received aid
under the IDEA, see State Level Data Files, supra note 78, and 49,315,842 students were
enrolled in public schools, see DIGEST STATISTICS, supra note 78. However in 2011 only

6,530,522 students received aid under the IDEA, see State Level Data Files, supra note 78,
despite an increase in the overall public school population to 49,521,669 students, see DIGEST
STATISTICS, supra note 78. This reflects a 2.431% decrease nationally, similar to the 2.434%
decline in North Carolina, in the number of IDEA-eligible students between 2006 and 2011,
despite a slight national increase in public school enrollment by .417%.
8
It warrants mention that North Carolina experienced an increase in the number of
complaints initiated even after the 2004 amendments to the IDEA that authorized the imposition
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On the second question, whether parents prevail less often under North
Carolina's reduced educational standard for children with disabilities, the data
is interesting and invites further study. It should be noted, of course, that the
data presented here does not inform causation. Nothing here suggests that the
change in the law causes any change in win/loss rates for parents. Factors other
than changes in the law impact these rates. Most significantly, according to this
research, changes associated with parental representation and pro se status 8 2
change at roughly the same rate as the changes in the win rate for parents
before and after the 2006 amendments.
With this caveat, generally speaking, intuition pans out here to a small,
but statistically insignificant, degree. The percentage of cases in which parents
prevailed on at least one issue dropped 9.7 percentage points in the six years
following passage of the amendments.84 Conversely, the percentage of cases in
which school systems prevailed on at least one issue increased by 13.5
percentage points over the same period.
Notably, however, the number of pro se parents also increased in the
six years following the 2006 amendments.86 This number increased by nearly 8
percentage points. This increase in parental pro se status closely approximates
the decrease in parental success. And pro se status better predicts parental
success than the changes in North Carolina's special-education laws 87

of attorneys' fees on parents and parents' attorneys for filing or pursuing frivolous due-process
proceedings.
82

See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the data regarding outcomes for parties represented by

parents as compared to parties proceeding pro se).
8
The parental "win" rate, treating a "win" as success on any part of a claim even if not the
entire claim, declined by 9.7 percentage points, and parental representation by counsel declined
by 7.7 percentage points.
84
Parents prevailed on at least one issue in 13 of41 cases between 2000 and 2005, 31.7% of
the cases over that period. From 2007 to 2012, parents prevailed on at least one issue in only 11
of 50 cases, or 22.0% of the cases over that period. The p-value representing the statistical
significance of the change in "win" rates pre- and post-2006 is .096, too high to represent
statistical significance using Pearson's Chi-squared measure.
85
Schools prevailed on at least one issue in 33 of 41 cases between 2000 and 2005, or in
80.5% of the cases. From 2007 to 2012, schools prevailed on at least one issue in 47 of 50 cases,
or in 94.0% of the cases. Notably, however, this increase in school "wins" is not statistically
significant using Pearson's Chi-squared measure (p =.099).
86
While this research cannot establish the cause of this observation, two changes in the law
are interesting to think about in this context. First, the change in North Carolina's substantive

entitlement in 2006 raises the question of whether some attorneys have begun tightening the
standards by which they might take cases to minimize their risk of loss. Additionally, the
addition of authority to impose attorneys' fees upon parents' attorneys, should they pursue what
ends up being characterized as a frivolous claim, may have deterred some attorneys from getting
involved in these cases. Observations like these are merely speculation for further research.
87
It is impossible to determine which, if any, of the significant changes in 2006 (the change
in the educational standard applied to children with disabilities, the addition of pre-complaint
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governing children with disabilities using a multiple linear regression
analysis.

B. Statutory Changes in the Availability of State-Funded, Pre-Complaint
Mediation Priorto InitiatingTier-One Hearings
Just as scrutiny of first-tier decisions following the 2006 changes to the
statutory educational standard for children with disabilities revealed some
counter-intuitive results, an examination of those decisions in light of the 2006
addition of pre-hearing mediation options also exposes counter-intuitive results.
This section first explains the 2006 amendments regarding availability of prehearing mediation and then reports the data on the effect of these amendments
on the numbers of cases pressed forward through a full hearing.

mediation, the change in the statute of limitations, etc.) correlated most with the observable
effects on frequency and outcomes in first-tier special-education cases. Thus, this Article cannot
and does not conclude that the change in the standard (which is the focus of this section of this
Article) had the effect of decreasing parents' success. Again, however, the decline in parental
success by 9.7 percentage points was not statistically significant at this time (p = .096). Should
the pattern observed here continue, however, it could become statistically significant, particularly
given its current proximity to significance.
88
The following table reflects the results of a multiple linear regression analysis of outcomes
(parental success) measured against the dependent variables of representation status and pre- or

post-2006 filing, showing that the two dependent variables account for approximately 40% of the
outcome (see Multiple R value) and that the influence of pro se status is statistically significant (p
= .0002) at a coefficient of -.36, but the influence of pre- or post-2006 is not (p = .99):
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.403426351
0.16275282
R Square
Adjusted R Square
0.141284944
Standard Error
0.414738528
Observations
81
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Pro Se
Pre-2006

2
78
80

SS
MS
F
SignificeneeF
2.608063716 1.304032 7.581225897 0.000980153
13.41652764 0.172008
16.02469136

Coefficients StandardError
Stot
P-value
0.471480753
0.084860097 5.555977 3.69692E-07
-0.360931598
0.093501017 -3.86019, 0.000232219
0.001404889
0.093271002 0.015062 0.988020826

Lower95%
Upper95% Lower95O% Upper90%
0.302537278 0.64024226 0.302537278 0.640424228
-0.547077823 -0.174785372 -0.547077823 -0.174785372
-0.184283411 0.187093189 -0.184283411 0.187093189

Again, no causal determinations about any factor considered may be reached by this study. All
information is merely descriptive and reflective of correlations. This Author continues to further
catalogue the ALJ decisions under review to determine whether any additional meaningful
statistical patterns emerge. This Author also encourages others to engage in further study seeking
greater understanding about causation.
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Until mid-2005, the IDEA required that mediation be available only
after a due-process complaint was filed. In the 2004 re-authorization of the Act,
in provisions that took effect on July 1, 2005, Congress required that states
make mediation available whether or not any party had requested a due-process
hearing.89

North Carolina revised its special-education legislation to reflect this
new federal requirement in 2006. From that time forward, North Carolina's law
has stated: "It is the policy of this State to encourage local educational agencies
and parents to seek mediation involving any dispute under this Article,
including matters arising before or after filing" a due-process complaint
seeking a hearing before an ALJ. 90
North Carolina's policies governing services for children with
disabilities further require that each local educational agency "must ensure that
procedures are established and implemented to allow parties to disputes
involving any matter under these Policies, includingmatters arisingpriorto the
filing of a petition for a due process hearing, to resolve disputes through a
mediation process." 91 They also require that the "SEA [state educational

agency] must bear the cost of the mediation process," making it free for parents
of children with disabilities and for local school systems. 92
Given that North Carolina's 2006 amendments to its special-education
laws aligned federal and state law on the substantive educational goal of the
legislation and added a non-adversarial, pre-hearing mediation option, one
might expect the number of fully litigated special-education claims to decline
post amendments. This did not happen.
From January 2000 to December 2005 (prior to the effectiveness of
North Carolina's 2006 revisions), 41 of the special-education cases available
for this research progressed through a full contested case hearing and written
ALJ decision. From January 2007 through December 2012 (following the
effectiveness of North Carolina's 2006 revisions), 50 special-education cases
progressed through a full contested case hearing and written ALJ decision. As

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1) (2013) (requiring mediation even in "matters arising prior to the
filing of a complaint"). According to the legislative record, Congress enacted this change to (1)
capitalize on cost savings realized through previous special-education mediations and (2) reduce
the adversarial character of special-education proceedings. The Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions reported that it revised the mediation timeline in order to build
upon the national success in resolving disputes through mediation. S. REP. No. 108-185, at 36-37
(2003). The Committee noted Michigan and Texas surveys that found 82.3% and 96%,
respectively, of people who used mediation would do so again. Id. In Texas, 77% of cases settled
in mediation. Id. at 37. This saved an estimated $50 million in attorneys' fees and litigation
expenses. Id. California experienced even greater success, with 93% of mediated cases settling.
Id.
90
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.4(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
91
N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, § 1504-1.7(a) (emphasis added).
92
Id. § 1504-1.7(b)(4).
89
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noted above, this reflects a 22% increase in the number of cases litigated to a
final ALJ decision in the six-year period after passage of the 2006 amendments
as compared to the six-year period prior to that passage. 93 Interestingly, the two
years in which the greatest numbers of fully litigated cases were filed, 2010 (12
cases) and 2011 (13 cases), both arose after this change in the law.
This statistical increase does not establish that the 2006 amendments
caused an increase in fully litigated tier-one hearings. To the contrary, other
factors, beyond the special-education laws of the state, may have influenced
this increase. In fact, across the country in many jurisdictions the rate of fully
litigated hearings is declining. 94 However, as noted above, the number of
children served in special education in North Carolina decreased from 192,451
in 2006 to 190,098 in 2012, 9 representing a 1.22% decrease in the number of
students served while the rate of fully litigated tier-one hearings increased by
22%. A comprehensive study of factors that might influence the rate of increase
in special-education litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
In the end, this research does not determine whether North Carolina's
2006 amendments changing the state's special-education goal and providing
pre-hearing mediation at public expense had any direct causal impact. This
research does reflect an uptick in litigation between 2007 and 2012 when
compared to numbers in 2000 through 2005. Notably, however, in 2012, the
most recent year considered, the smallest number (three) of special-education
contested cases reached final written decision by an ALJ. It has yet to be
determined whether this downtick in fully litigated tier-one hearings indicates
the beginning of a trend toward fewer fully litigated cases or stands alone as an
outlier. 9 6 Further research may begin to answer these questions.
C.

Clarificationof the Burden ofProofand Statute ofLimitations

Two clarifications of procedural obligations on participants in North
Carolina's first-tier special-education claims warrant attention. In 2005, the
Supreme Court clarified that the burden of proof in these administrative

93
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (demonstrating the manner in which this 22%
increase was determined).
94

See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that most of the

reported decline in the number of special-education cases nationally over the last decade is a
result of a decline in the number of cases in New York, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia); Weber, supra note 23, at 508-09 (noting that, according to one source, "the latest
data [through 2012] show[s] a 10% decline in the number of hearing requests over the past seven
years, and a 58% decline in hearings held").
9s
See State Level Data Files, supra note 78.
96
The Exceptional Children Division is beginning to load new decisions on its website.
Some are posted from 2014 and 2015. See HearingDecisions, supra note 55 (reporting selected
2014 decisions from Winston-Salem/Forsyth County, Johnston County, and Cherokee County
and selected 2015 decisions from Charlotte-Mecklenburg).
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hearings rested with the petitioner, including petitioner parents. The following
year, the North Carolina legislature amended the governing statute of
limitations to expand it from 60 days to 1 year. Although the clarification of
placement of the burden of proof had no impact in this State, the expansion of
the statutory limitation period opened the door to a larger basis for claims.
1. Burden of Proof
In 2005 in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,9 7 the United States
Supreme Court held that petitioners in special-education cases, including
petitioner parents, retain the burden of proof, and more particularly the burden
of persuasion, on all claims asserted. 9 8 Until that time, jurisdictions had been
split on this question. Some courts held that after a parent identified a concern
about a child not receiving the education to which the child was entitled under
the IDEA, the burden of persuasion shifted to the school system to establish
that the school offered a free appropriate public education through a properly
developed individualized education plan (IEP) in the least restrictive
environment. 99
In North Carolina, however, ALJs had always imposed the burden of
proof on the petitioner, including parent petitioners.100 Well before Schaffer,
one North Carolina ALJ explained the following in response to petitioner
parents' motion to assign the burden of proof to the respondent school district:
After receiving briefs and arguments, the Undersigned
ruled . . that the Petitioners bore the burden of proof. Neither
the statutes involved nor the Fourth Circuit case law address

9

546 U.S. 49, 49 (2005).
Id. at 56-57 (noting that the "burden of proof' historically encompassed both the burden
of persuasion and the burden of production and emphasizing that this case implicates only the
burden of persuasion, attaching to the party who will lose if the evidence is closely balanced).
99
See, e.g., Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("In
practical terms, the school has an advantage when a dispute arises under the Act: the school has
better access to relevant information, greater control over the potentially more persuasive
witnesses (those who have been directly involved with the child's education), and greater overall
educational expertise than the parents."); Lascari ex rel. Lascari v. Bd. of Educ., 560 A.2d 1180,
1188-89 (N.J. 1989) (stating that in view of the school district's "better access to relevant
information," parents' obligations "should be merely to place the issue of appropriateness of the
IEP" before the school, and "the school board should then bear the burden of proving that the IEP
was appropriate").
100
See, e.g., Student v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0171 and No. 01
EDC 0802, slip op. at 3 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Sept. 11, 2002); Parent v. Wake Cty. Pub.
Sch. Bd., 00 EDC 1452, slip op. at 10 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 6, 2001); Student v.
Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ., 00 EDC 0616, slip op. at 13 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 4,
2001); Parent v. Columbus Cty. Bd. of Educ., 00 EDC 0705, slip op. at 13 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 18, 2001).
9
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the issue of burden of proof. The other circuits are mixed. The
Undersigned found that in this particular case that the burden
of proving tha[t] an IEP that had been jointly developed and
implemented for the length of time involved failed to meet the
legal standards as well as the other issues presented at hearing
fell to the party [the Petitioner parents] challenging the
plan....101
Given that North Carolina placed the burden of proof on petitioners
throughout the period covered by this research, and long before Schaffer in
2005, it is not surprising that the legislature did not change that burden in its
2006 overhaul of the State's special-education law. 102 And it makes sense that
this decision had no identifiable impact on outcomes here. 103
2. Statute of Limitations
Although North Carolina had already placed the burden of proof on
petitioners prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Schaffer, North Carolina
held on to its 60-day statutory limitations period until prompted by changes in
the federal law to enlarge it.
The 2004 revisions to the IDEA, which took effect on July 1, 2005,
introduced for the first time a federal statute of limitations in special-education
administrative claims. The relevant 2004 revision provided:
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process
hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or
should have known about the alleged action that forms the
basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time

Wake Cty., No. 01 ED 0171 and No. 01 EDC 0802, slip op. at 3.
A number of jurisdictions have, however, modified their state special-education laws to
place the burden of proof on school systems, even in cases where the parent is the petitioner. See,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-1.1 (West 2015) (providing that the burden of proof in specialeducation cases falls on the school system); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1) (McKinney 2015)
(imposing the burden of proof on school systems to establish that the school offers FAPE, but
leaving burden of proof on parents when they seek "tuition reimbursement for a unilateral
placement" in a private school); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 388.507 (2015) ("Whenever a due process
hearing is held pursuant to the [IDEA] . . the school district has the burden of proof and the
burden of production."). Other states continue to consider legislation to accomplish this goal. See
S. 0390, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015); H. 0344, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
101

102

(Md.

2015);

MD.

COAL.

FOR

SPECIAL

EDUC.

RIGHTS

&

BURDEN

OF

PROOF,

www.burdenofproofnd.org. (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). No such legislation has been considered
in North Carolina.
103
See supra Part III.A-B (offering the statistical data to support the conclusion that the 2006
changes in North Carolina's special-education laws had no statistically significant impact on
frequency or outcomes of first-tier hearings).
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limitation for requesting such a hearing under this [part], in
such time as the State law allows.1 04
At the time this federal legislation passed and took effect, North
Carolina relied upon a generic 60-day limitation period imported from the state
administrative procedure act. This catch-all provision provided that "[u]nless
another statute or a federal statute or regulation sets a time limitation for the
filing of a petition in contested cases against a specified agency, the general
limitation for the filing of a petition in a contested case is 60 days." 05
The 60-day statutory limitation period presented a challenge to parents
seeking review of issues arising under the IDEA. Claims were regularly
dismissed in violation of that limit.106

Following implementation of the 2004 revisions to the IDEA, in 2006
the North Carolina legislature revised its special-education laws. In these
revisions, the North Carolina legislature included a specific statutory
limitations period within the State's special-education laws. As a result, when
this legislation became effective on July 10, 2006, the catch-all provision in
North Carolina's administrative procedure act no longer applied in this context.
Instead, the particular limitation period began to apply. This limitation period
extended the time within which complaints arising under the IDEA must be
asserted in a due-process complaint from 60 days to 1 year. 0 7 While one might
expect this change to reduce the number of cases dismissed on procedural
grounds in the most recent six years under review, 108 that was not the case. This
change had no statistically significant impact on the number of claims
ultimately dismissed by written decision of an ALJ for violation of the statute
of limitations.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(2)(C) (2013).
105
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-23(f) (2015); C.M. ex rel. J.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 241 F.3d 374,
384-85 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 818 (2001) (holding that the North Carolina
Administrative Procedure Act's sixty-day statute of limitations was appropriately applied in
special-education cases and was consistent with IDEA along with the accompanying notice
requirements contained in the North Carolina statute).
104

1o6
See, e.g., Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129 (N.C. Office
of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 7, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC
1284 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
No. 06 EDC 0464 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 17, 2006); C.L. v. N. High Sch. Principal,
04 EDC 0268 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 8, 2005); Student v. Bd. of Educ., No. 04 EDC
0838 and No. 04 EDC 0854 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 22, 2004); Student v. Cabarrus
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 00 EDC 0616 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June 4, 2001); Parents v. Terrel
Lane Middle Sch., 01 EDC 0210 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 2, 2001); Student v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 01 EDC 0110 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 23, 2001).
107
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6(b).
1os
In fact, from 2000 through 2006, only eight claims were dismissed on these procedural
grounds, but from 2007 through 2012, 18 cases were dismissed.
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Ultimately, recent changes in law ranging from re-calibrating the level
of education required for children with disabilities to lengthening the statute of
limitations, failed to have the impacts intuitively expected. Even free precomplaint mediation, which has reduced the number of fully litigated dueprocess proceedings nationwide, has not correlated with that consequence here.
Further research is necessary to fully understand these outcomes.
IV. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: TRANSCENDING TIER-ONE ANECDOTES WITH
DATA AND RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION

Having established in Parts II and III the legal and empirical
foundation necessary to give context to statistical data depicting the current
litigation landscape in North Carolina's special-education due-process
proceedings, this Part shifts gears and offers the litigation data. It introduces
data on North Carolina's fully litigated first-tier special-education litigation in
three categories: data on parents and children, data on traditional public
schools, and data on charter schools.
A.

Data on Parents

Empirical review of first-tier administrative decisions in specialeducation cases reveals a number of interesting statistical observations about
the parents involved. First, parents are overwhelmingly petitioners, not
respondents, in these cases. Second, parent petitioners rarely prevail in first-tier
hearings. Third, parent outcomes improve with legal counsel. Finally, with two
exceptions, parent outcomes remain consistent regardless of the age of the child
whose education is at issue or the type of disability accommodated. This
section of the Article reports the data supporting each of these observations.
1. Parents, Not Schools, Typically Initiate First-Tier Due-Process
Proceedings
Both federal and state laws establish that parents of children with
disabilities and public school systems educating those children (both traditional
and charter) may originate due-process proceedings. These proceedings protect
the substantive right of children with disabilities to a free appropriate public
education in the least restrictive educational environment possible.
The IDEA requires that states provide "an opportunity for any party" to
present a due-process complaint "with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child [with a
disability], or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child.""9 The IDEA's implementing regulations make clear that a "parent or a

109

20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
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public agency may file a due process complaint" on any of these specialeducation issues.
North Carolina law mirrors federal law on this point. North Carolina
General Statutes section 115C-109.6 reiterates that "[a]ny party" may file a
petition for an "impartial hearing with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child [with a
disability], or the provision of a free appropriate public education [FAPE] of
[such] child, or a manifestation determination.""' The State Board of
Education Department of Public Instruction's special-education policies
likewise confirm that a "parent or an LEA [local educational agency] may file a
request for a due process hearing on matters related to the identification,
evaluation or educational placement of a child with a disability, the provision
of FAPE to the child or a manifestation determination." 12
Although both parents and school systems are equally entitled to
initiate due-process proceedings to ensure the full enforcement of the IDEA,113
parents and school systems do not initiate and pursue these proceedings in
equal numbers.
Of the 97 AU decisions collected, catalogued, and considered in this
analysis, parents of children with disabilities initiated the due-process
proceedings in 94 of them.1 14 In other words, 96.9% of all the AU decisions
issued over the 12-year period covered by this study resolved complaints raised
by parents.
It warrants observation that although 96.9% of due-process
proceedings under the IDEA are initiated by parents, only a miniscule fraction
of parents of children with disabilities actually press disputes to this stage. For
example, in 2011, the year covered by this research with the largest number of
fully litigated cases, 187,767 children with disabilities were eligible for services
under the IDEA in North Carolina's public schools."' And in that year only 11
110

34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a).

"

N.C. GEN. STAT.

112

N.C.

POLICIES,

§ 1 15C-109.6.
supra note 50, § 1504-1.8(a)(1).

1
Neither parents nor school systems are required to initiate due-process proceedings,
however. And school systems in particular are not required to initiate due process even when
school officials believe a child is one with a disability who is not receiving appropriate
accommodations under the IDEA if the child's parents are informed and the parents refuse
consent. See, e.g., K.A. v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 741 F.3d 1195, 1206 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding
that a school district is not required to invoke due process when a parent revokes consent to a
changed IEP).
114
Only the following three of the total available set of ALJ decisions reviewed involved
school-system petitioners: Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Parent, No. 04 EDC 1131 (N.C. Office
of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 12, 2004); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Father, No. 01 EDC 1802
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2002); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mr., No. 00 EDC
0465 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 12, 2001).
115
See State Level Data Files, supra note 78.
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parents filed contested cases that ultimately led to a written decision of an ALJ.
This means a mere .007% of the families who could initiate the impartial dueprocess hearing available under the IDEA actually did so, pressing their
complaints through to full, written decision before an ALJ.
2. Parents Rarely Prevail Without an Attorney
Litigation outcomes reflected in written ALJ decisions following firsttier due-process hearings favor school systems. As noted above, of the 97
decisions available for analysis, parents of children with disabilities initiated
94, and school systems started 3.116 This section presents parents' win/loss
records in the 94 cases parents initiated.
In considering these win/loss records, the Author emphasizes three
important initial observations. First, the win/loss data presented here derives
only from cases in which the parties did not settle their disputes at a resolution
meeting prior to hearing, 1 17 during mediation,' 18 or in the course of the first-tier
hearing as evidence was exposed. Second, the data presented here reflects only
cases in which a due-process complaint culminated in a written decision issued
by an ALJ. Finally, nothing about the data presented here addresses the merits
of any of the due-process claims counted, and nothing about the data here can
establish the cause of the success or failure of any particular claim or group of
claims.
With these caveats in mind, the win/loss records tabulated in the
decisions reviewed in preparation of this Article present a provocative picture
of North Carolina's special-education litigation at its first-tier administrative
review.
How often did petitioner parents prevail at the first-tier administrative
review on all issues raised in their complaints before the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) over this period? Parents fully prevailed
13.8% of the time.11 9

116

See supra note 114 and cases cited therein.

117
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B) (2013) (requiring a resolution meeting after a due-process
complaint has been filed, but before hearing, unless specified circumstances exist); 34 C.F.R. §
300.510 (2015) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.7 (2015) (same); N.C. POLICIES, supra note
50, § 1504-1.11 (same).
118
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (requiring pre-hearing mediation be available, regardless of
whether a due-process complaint has been filed, at no cost to parties); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506
(2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.4 (same); N.C. POLICIES, supra note 50, at § 1404-1.7
(same).
119

It is interesting to consider this statistic in the context of win rates in other states. For

example, in Iowa, parents won in 32% of the cases studied. Perry Zirkel et al., Creeping
Judicialization in Special Education Hearings?: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT'L Ass'N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27, 37 (2007). In Wisconsin and Minnesota, parents with attorneys
prevailed fully 14% of the time. Cope-Kasten, supra note 24, at 37.
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Of the 94 due-process complaints initiated by parents of children with
disabilities from 2000 through 2012 and not resolved prior to completion of the
first-tier hearing, parents prevailed following decision by the first-tier AU on
all issues in their complaints in 13 cases.1 20 And no parent prevailed on all
issues in a due-process proceeding at any time during the last three years of the
study.121

Considering a similar question from an alternative perspective, parents
lost on all issues raised in their special-education complaints 72.3% of the time.
They lost on everything in 68 cases out of the 94 cases they presented as
petitioners.
Parent petitioners, of course, may raise more than one issue in a single
due-process complaint. This raises a new question: How often did petitioner
parents prevail on one issue, but lose on another in their first-tier review before
OAH? Parents prevailed on at least one issue, and lost on at least one issue in
an additional 13 cases, 13.8% of the time.
Of the 94 due-process complaints initiated by parents of children with
disabilities from 2000 through 2012 and not resolved prior to completion of the
first-tier hearing, parents prevailed following the hearing before the first-tier
AU on at least one issue in their complaints in 26 cases,1 2 2 or 27.7% of the

120
Student v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2969 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June
18, 2009); Student v. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 2339 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. Aug. 29, 2008); Student v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 29, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 7, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No.
06 EDC 1284 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2007); Student v. New Hanover Cty. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., No. 06 EDC 0500 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 25, 2006); Father v. Randolph Cty.
Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 1543 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 18, 2006); Parents v.
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 03 EDC 1637 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June
20, 2005); Student v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Dec. 23, 2002); Father v. Randolph Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 1263 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 16, 2002); Parent v. Johnston Cty. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0067 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. June 21, 2002); Ms. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0204 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 27, 2002); Mr. L. v. Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 01 EDC 0878 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 13, 2001).
121
See, e.g., Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2969 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June
18, 2009) (reflecting the most recent case in the period covered by this study in which a parent
petitioner prevailed on all issues).
122
Student v. Johnston Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 11 EDC 04970 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Apr. 12, 2012); Student v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 11 EDC 3178 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. Nov. 2011); Student v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 10 EDC 1370
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Oct. 7, 2011); Student v. Wake Cty. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 09
EDC 4193 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 16, 2010); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2328
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2329 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ.., No. 08 EDC 2969; CabarrusCty. Bd. of
Educ., No. 07 EDC 2339; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1389 (N.C. Office
of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 15, 2008); Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605; Student v.
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time. These 26 cases include, of course, the 13 cases discussed previously in
which parents prevailed on all issues and the 13 cases in which parents both
prevailed and lost on at least one issue.
Considering this question of partial parental success from another
perspective, parents lost on at least one issue 86.2% of the time. Of the 94
complaints brought by parent petitioners, they experienced loss on at least one
issue in 81 cases.
The following table reflects some of the data described above in this
section. It illustrates each of the following pieces of data: (1) the number of
due-process complaints filed and pursued through a full hearing by parents of
children with disabilities from 2000 through 2012, (2) the number and
percentage of cases in which the petitioner parents prevailed on all issues over
that same period,1 23 and (3) the number and percentage of cases in which
petitioner parents prevailed before an ALJ on at least one issue presented for
hearing. 124

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1074 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 30,
2007); Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129; Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of
Educ., No. 06 EDC 1284; New Hanover Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 0500; Randolph
Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 1543; Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No.
06 EDC 0464 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 17, 2006); Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of
Educ., No. 03 EDC 1637; Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461; Mr. C. v. Union Cty.
Pub. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0622 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 21, 2002); Student v. Wake
Cty. Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0171 and No. 0802 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Sept. 11, 2002); Randolph Cty. Sch. Bd. ofEduc., No. 01 EDC 1263; Wake Cty. Bd. ofEduc., No.
01 EDC 0204; Johnston Cty. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0067; Mr. L. v. Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 01
EDC 0878 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 13, 2001); Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 00 EDC 0128;
Student v. Caldwell Cty. Schs., No. 01 EDC 0083 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Mar. 22, 2001).
123
This table reflects outcomes in cases in which petitioners prevailed on all issues identified
in their due-process complaints because, in a majority of cases, ALJs resolve all issues in favor of
a single party. Of the first-tier final ALJ decisions considered in preparation of this Article,
86.6% ended with a single party prevailing on all issues. In only a relatively small minority of
cases (13.4%), the ALJ reached a split decision and determined that each party prevailed on
portions of the complaint.
124
Some of the outcomes reflected in this chart were appealed to the second-tier
administrative review before a State Hearing Review Officer. In those cases, the State Hearing
Review Officer may (or may not) have reversed some of the ALJ outcomes during the secondtier review. This Article does not contain data on the rate at which parties pursue second-tier
administrative review or the outcomes of such appeals. The Author has acquired and is reviewing
and cataloging North Carolina's Senior Review Officer (S.R.O.) decisions in special-education
matters from 2000 through 2012 and will publish the results of that review once complete.
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Winning percentage in cases
Type of
Petitioner

pursued through issuance of a
written ALJ decision from 2000
through 2012 in cases in which
this party prevailed on all claims.

Winning percentage in cases
pursued through issuance of a
written AU decision from 2000
through 2012 in cases in which this
party prevailed on at least one issue.

27.7%

Parent of a
Child with a
Disability
n = 94

[Vol. 118

13.8%
n = 13

n = 26 (note that this number
includes those cases reflected to the
left in which parent petitioners
prevailed on all issues)

These parental success rates are consistent with parental success rates
in other states where due-process proceedings have been examined, but they are
inconsistent with parental success rates in the District of Columbia where
parents enjoy higher rates of representation by legal counsel. In Ohio, for
example, another state with a two-tiered due-process proceeding, parents
prevailed in 32.7% of the cases studied, and it was "nearly impossible for
parents to prevail in Ohio without the assistance of highly sophisticated legal
counsel."l25 Similarly, in Florida, parents prevailed in only 15.1% of the cases
initiated, and only one parent prevailed without an attorney or an advocate. 126
Likewise, in New Jersey, in emergent relief petitions, parents prevailed in
approximately 17% of the cases they initiated, and 63.7% of prevailing parents
were represented by an attorney.1 27
In contrast to the relatively low rates of parental success in North
Carolina, Ohio, Florida, and New Jersey, parents prevailed in over half (57%)
of the 100 cases resolved between 2010 and 2011 in the District of
Columbia.128 In the District of Columbia, however, in contrast to North
Carolina and other states where data is available, "legal counsel nearly always
represented" parents of children with disabilities. 9 This raises the next
question: Does parental representation correlate with an increase in favorable
outcomes for parents in North Carolina's first-tier hearings?

125

COLKER, supra note 24, at 149, 151.

126
Id. at 160 (noting that the single parent who prevailed without an attorney or advocate was
a "social worker who seemed to have some expertise in special education matters").
127

Id. at 177.

128

Id. at 211.

129

Id.
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3. Parents' Representation Matters
Although school systems typically retain legal counsel in specialeducation litigation proceedings,1 30 parents often do not. In Winkelman ex rel.
Winkelman v. Parma City School District,13 1 the Supreme Court highlighted

and expansively interpreted the authority of parents to appear pro se throughout
these unique proceedings. This section of the Article first offers background on
the law authorizing parents to represent themselves and their children pro se in
these matters. It then presents the statistical relationship between parental
representation and hearing outcomes.
In Winkelman, the Supreme Court addressed the question of "whether
parents, either on their own behalf or as representatives of the child, may
proceed in court [in a special-education appeal under the IDEA] unrepresented
by counsel though they are not trained or licensed as attorneys.,,132 The Court
held that non-lawyer parents of a child with a disability may represent
themselves and the interests of their children pro se in federal court, because
IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights that include the
entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their child. 133 The Court
premised its conclusion on recognition that
[a]ll concede that ... parents ha[ve] the statutory right to
contribute to this process [of developing their child's
independent educational program to ensure the child's access
to a free appropriate public education] and, when agreement
[can] not be reached, to participate in administrative
proceedings includin what the Act refers to as an "impartial
due process hearing." 34
The Court then determined that because "[t]he parents enjoy
enforceable rights at the administrative stage ... it would be inconsistent with
the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in
federal court." 1 35
Through its analysis, the Supreme Court highlighted and affirmed
parents' authority to proceed in special-education litigation pro se. Naturally,
then, North Carolina ALJs see a good number of pro se parents in specialeducation due-process proceedings. Given the complexity of the law in this
School-system parties were represented by counsel in 100% of the cases in which it was
possible to determine from the written ALJ decisions whether counsel appeared.
131
550 U.S. 516, 533 (2007) (holding that the IDEA provides independent and enforceable
rights to parents, and these rights extend to appropriate public education for their children).
132
Id. at 520.
130

134

Id. at 516.
Id. at 519-20 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2000)).

13s

Id. at 526.

133
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area, unrepresented parents may face challenges without some legal training or
support.
State Hearing Review Officer Joe D. Walters characterized this
challenge poignantly in resolving a second-tier review of a due-process
complaint brought by a pro se parent against the Cumberland County Schools.
He wrote:
This case illustrates the risks a pro se parent takes in a
due process hearing. There are very specific rules and
procedures to follow. Both Petitioners and Respondents are
held to the same standard and must follow these rules and
procedures. No specific exception is allowed for a pro se
parent. The rules and procedures are clearly set forth in federal
law, state law, federal regulations, and state policies. A failure
to follow those rules and procedures can be fatal to a
potentially legitimate claim. Regardless of how valid a claim
may be, the ALJ and Review Officer are both restricted by the
specificity of the applicable laws, regulations, and policies.
The Respondent's attorney [the school system's
attorney] must represent his client. In this case, he clearly used
the specifics in the law to argue for the Respondent's position.
That the Petitioner [parent] perceived this as unfair and did not
allow her to present her full case is regrettable, but both parties
have the same hearing rights.... In this instance, Respondent
[school system] exercised those rights to the detriment of the
Petitioner's [parent's] case.
The Petitioner [parent], in this case, had several claims
that may have succeeded if presented in accordance with the
laws, regulations, and policies. The Review Officer, however,
does not and cannot decide for the Petitioner simply because
Petitioner is a pro se parent. To favor a pro se parent when
they are not following the required procedures would indicate
bias in favor of the parent. 136
State Hearing Review Officer Walter's candid assessment of the
impact of proceeding pro se, along with research in other states concluding that
it is "nearly impossible" for parents to prevail without an attorney,137 invites a
comparison of outcomes in cases in which parents retain legal counsel to
represent their interests and in which parents proceed pro se.
As noted above, 97 written ALJ decisions issued in North Carolina
from 2000 through 2012 form the basis for the analysis in this Article. In the

136
Petitoner v. Cumberland Cty. Schs., 12 EDC 03259 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. July 19,
2012) (State Review Officer decision).
137
COLKER, supra note 24, at 151.
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overwhelming majority (89.7%) of the 97 ALJ decisions reviewed, the ALJ
stated plainly whether legal counsel appeared on behalf of any, all, or none of
the parties to the proceeding. In ten of these decisions (10.3%), however, it was
impossible to discern whether the parties were represented in the first-tier dueprocess proceeding leading to the written ALJ decision.' 38
Of the ten cases in which it was impossible to discern whether any
party to the proceeding was represented, most were time barred or failed to
state a claim properly. These procedural and pleading errors might suggest that
the petitioners in those cases were pro se, but lawyers make these mistakes, too.
This analysis thus treats as non-determinative all ten cases in which the ALJ
decision did not clearly state whether a party was represented. All cases nondeterminative on representation status were excluded from the analysis of that
factor. This means the total number of cases considered in this sub-section of
the study is 87.
Pro se petitioners account for just over half (54%) of the petitioners in
first-tier due-process proceedings in which it is possible to discern from the
written ALJ decision whether parties retained counsel. This 12-year study
identified 45 written first-tier decisions with pro se petitioners.
All (100%) of the pro se petitioners in these cases were parents of
children with disabilities. None (0%) of the identified pro se petitioners in the
period covered by this study were school systems. 139
Pro se respondents account for only 2.3% of the respondents in firsttier due-process proceedings in which it was possible to discern from the
written ALJ decision whether parties retained counsel.1 4 0 Again, all (100%) of

See Student v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 00 EDC 0817 (State Review Officer
decision) (missing ALJ decision required reliance on State Hearing Review Officer decision to
discern what happened at the first-review, and although the parent was represented before the
SRO, it remains unclear whether the parent was represented before the ALJ at the first-tier
hearing); Student v. Caldwell Cty. Sch., No. 01 EDC 0083 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Mar.
22, 2001) (same); see also Parent v. Buncombe Cty. Schs., No. 10 EDC 7420 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Mar. 22, 2011); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 11 EDC 0938
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 14, 2011); Student v. Union Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 10 EDC
6732 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 4, 2011); Mother v. Buncombe Cty. Schs., No. 10 EDC
6857 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 22, 2010); Student v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd.
of Educ., No. 10 EDC 2793 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Sept. 17, 2010); Student v. Buncombe
Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 09 EDC 4879 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Sept. 8, 2009); Student v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 0731 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 18,
2005); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 0700 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. July 18, 2005).
139
Of course, it is possible that there was a pro se school-system petitioner among those in
the ten cases in which it is impossible to determine whether the parties had counsel at the firsttier hearing. This Article neither proves nor disproves that possibility.
140
See Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Parent, No. 04 EDC 1131 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Aug. 12, 2004); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Father, No. 01 EDC 1802 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Jan 2002).
138
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the pro se respondents in these cases were parents of children with disabilities.
None (0%) of the identified pro se respondents were school systems.141
Given the frequency with which parents appear pro se in specialeducation litigation, one might intuit that this approach frequently yields
favorable results. It generally does not. 142
Pro se parents prevailed on all issues in only 1 of the 45 cases initiated
and prosecuted by pro se parent petitioners. 14 3 In other words, pro se parent
petitioners who pressed their due-process complaints forward through a hearing
to issuance of a written ALJ decision prevailed on their entire claim only 2.2%
of the time. Notably, in the single case in which a pro se parent petitioner
prevailed on all claims presented, the parent had assistance from a non-attorney
advocate.'" As such, while this study included the parent as a pro se parent
because she did not retain legal counsel, the prevailing parent did have some
counsel and assistance.
Pro se parents prevailed on at least one issue in 5 of the 45 cases
initiated and prosecuted by pro se parent petitioners. 145 In other words, pro se
parent petitioners who pressed their due-process complaints forward through a
hearing to issuance of a written ALJ decision prevailed on something, but not
necessarily everything, presented in their complaint 11.1% of the time. Of
course, one of the five cases in which a pro se parent prevailed on at least one
issue is the same case counted above, in which the pro se parent prevailed on
all issues with the assistance of a non-attorney advocate. Notably, of the
remaining four cases in this group, two involved the same parent.
Taken together, these facts about pro se parent petitioners produce a
noteworthy data point. Over the 12-year period covered in this study, only four
141
Again, of course, it is possible that there was a pro se, school-system respondent among
those cases in which it is impossible to determine whether the parties had counsel. This Article
neither proves nor disproves that possibility.
142
See Weber, supra note 23, at 509 (recognizing after surveying the literature that although
parents "do win" when they appear pro se, "the rate of winning goes up dramatically when
[parents] have attorney representation").
143
Student v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Dec. 23, 2002). It is statistically significant (p = .0003), using a Chi-squared test in which p
equals the likelihood that this would happen by chance, that parents prevail so infrequently on all
issues in a case when they appear pro se.
'"
Id., slip op. at 1 (indicating that the parent enjoyed the assistance of a non-attorney
advocate).
145
Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2329 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Student v.
T.D., No. 09 EDC 2328 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009); Student v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1074 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 30, 2007);
Student v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 02 EDC 1461 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 23,
2002); Mr. C. v. Union Cty. Pub. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0622 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov.
21, 2002). It is statistically significant (p = .00006), using a Chi-squared test in which p equals
the likelihood that this would happen by chance, that parents so infrequently prevail on
something, at least one issue, in a case when they appear pro se.
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parents have successfully resolved a claim or part of a claim without the
assistance of an attorney at the first-tier impartial due-process procedure.
Parents have also appeared unrepresented as respondents in two dueprocess proceedings initiated by school systems. These pro se parent
respondents lost in both instances. 146 No pro se parent respondent prevailed
during the period covered by this study.
Of the 87 written AU decisions in which representation of the parties
could be clearly established, parents appeared pro se, as noted above, in 47
instances (45 times as a petitioner and twice as a respondent). 14 7 Parents
appeared through legal representation in 40 instances (39 times as a petitioner
and once as a respondent). 14 8 In other words, parents appeared unrepresented
54% of the time and through legal counsel 46% of the time.
Represented parent petitioners prevailed on all issues in their dueprocess complaints in 12 of the 39 cases in which parents petitioned through an
attorney.149 In other words, represented parent petitioners who pressed their
due-process complaints forward through a hearing to issuance of a written AU
decision prevailed on their entire claim 30.8% of the time.150
Parent petitioners prevailed on at least one issue in 20 of the 39 cases
in which they retained legal counsel to initiate and prosecute their due-process
complaints. In other words, represented parent petitioners who pressed their

See Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Parent, No. 04 EDC 1131 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Aug. 12, 2004); Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Father, No. 01 EDC 1802 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2002). Given the small sample size (3) of parent respondents, this loss rate
does not show statistical significance using a Chi-squared test, and no inferences can be drawn
from this result. Here, p = .08, and it must be less than .05 to indicate significance. Nonetheless,
these results offer an accurate historical reflection of the outcomes in these cases.
146

147

See CabarrusCty., No. 04 EDC 1131; CumberlandCty., No. 01 EDC 1802.

See Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mr., No. 00 EDC 0465 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Feb. 12, 2001).
149
See Student v. Orange Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2969 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
June 18, 2009); Student v. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 2339 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. Aug. 29, 2008); Student v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 29, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 06 EDC 1129
(N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 7, 2007); Student v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No.
06 EDC 1284 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Jan. 2007); Student v. New Hanover Cty. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., No. 06 EDC 0500 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Aug. 25, 2006); Father v. Randolph Cty.
Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 05 EDC 1543 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Apr. 18, 2006); Parents v.
Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 03 EDC 1637 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. June
20, 2005); Father v. Randolph Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 1263 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. Aug. 16, 2002); Parent v. Johnston Cty. Schs., No. 02 EDC 0067 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. June 21, 2002); Ms. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 EDC 0204 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. Feb. 27, 2002); Mr. L. v. Hickory Pub. Schs., No. 01 EDC 0878 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. Dec. 13, 2001).
1so
It is statistically significant (p = .0003), using a Chi-squared test in which p equals the
likelihood that this would happen by chance, that parents would prevail so much more frequently
on all issues in a case when they appear represented as compared to pro se.
148
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due-process complaints forward with the assistance of legal counsel through a
hearing to issuance of a written ALJ decision prevailed on something, although
not necessarily everything, in their complaints 51.3% of the time.'
Over the 12-year period covered in this study, only one written ALJ
decision reflects a case with a represented parent respondent in a due-process
proceeding initiated by a school system. The represented parent respondent
prevailed in that case. 152
The following table reflects some of the data described above in this
section. This format facilitates side-by-side comparisons of outcomes between
cases where parents of children with disabilities appear pro se and cases where
parents appear through legal counsel. The table illustrates each of the following
pieces of data: (1) the number of due-process complaints filed and pursued
through a full hearing by particular types of parents (pro se versus represented
petitioners and respondents) from 2000 through 2012, (2) the percentage and
number of complete "wins" involving each type of parent over the same period,
and (3) the percentage and number of cases in which each type of parent
prevailed on at least one issue in the written ALJ decision issued in the case. 5 3

It is worth emphasizing that this win rate for represented parents is statistically significant,
exceeding the expected win rate, using a Chi-squared test (p = .00006). Considering similar data
from another perspective, it is interesting to note that the represented parent petitioners lost their
entire claims only 48.7% of the time, in 19 cases.
152
Cumberland Cty., No. 00 EDC 0465 (illustrating a represented parent's success as a
respondent in overcoming a school system's attempt to completely exclude a student with a
disability as a dangerous student under a provision of the IDEA that has since been substantially
revised).
153
Some of the outcomes reflected in this chart were appealed to the second-tier
administrative review before a State Hearing Review Officer. In those cases, the State Hearing
Review Officer may (or may not) have reversed some of the ALJ outcomes during the secondtier review. This Article does not contain data on the rate at which parents, pro se or represented,
pursue second-tier administrative review or the outcomes of such appeals.
151
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Percentage of claims in which this type
of parent prevailed on all issues.

Percentage of claims in which
this type of parent prevailed on
at least one issue.
11.1%

2.2%

n=5*

sn= 1 *
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*This parent was not entirely pro se. She had
a non-attorney advocate representing her.

*As acknowledged to the left, one
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of these parents was not entirely
pro se. And two of these cases
involved the same parent.
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n=_1

n=20
100%
n
n=1

The Author emphasizes again that the cause of the outcomes reflected
in the ALJ decisions included in the chart above cannot be determined from the
information presented. There was no means by which the Author could
determine, for example, whether parents achieve higher success rates with
attorneys because attorneys take only the strongest cases, because they navigate
the procedure better, or because of some other reason or combination of
reasons. The Author notes, however, that in the District of Columbia where
"legal counsel nearly always represent[s]" parent petitioners, the parental
success rate is at 57%, similar to North Carolina's 51.3% success rate in the
group of cases in which legal counsel represented parents and in contrast to
North Carolina's 11.1% success rate for unrepresented parents.
Ultimately, although the data in this study of North Carolina's first-tier
decisions correlates parents' representation status with greater likelihood of
parental success in first-tier special-education due-process proceedings, it does
not demonstrate causation. 154
-4. Age of the Child and the Type of Disability Do Not Correlate with
Particular Outcomes in Tier-One Decisions and/or Likelihood of
Representation, with Two Exceptions
Speculation abounds about whether parents of children with particular
disabilities are more likely to litigate than others. Education observers have
The Pearson's correlation coefficient representing the strength of this relationship is r
.455. Pearson's correlation coefficients between .3 and .5 are generally considered to be medium
strength correlations. Anything at .5 or higher is considered to be a high strength correlation.
154
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suggested, often based on intuition, that special-education litigation is more or
less likely at certain ages or grades. In North Carolina, however, given the
sample size in this research, these independent variables indicate no statistically
significant impact on the likelihood that a parent will bring a due-process
complaint, prevail through this process, or seek legal representation-with two
exceptions. Parents of children with autism across various ages are more likely
than other parents to secure legal representation for first-tier hearings in
special-education disputes. And parents of pre-kindergarten children with
autism persisted in special-education disputes through full hearing and written
decision at a statistically significantly higher rate than parents of children with
other disabilities. 155
Of the 97 cases considered, not all identified the child's age or
disability. When a claim was dismissed on procedural grounds, as beyond the
statute of limitations, for example, ALJs had no reason to identify the child's
age or disability, and their decisions made no mention of them. Additionally, in
some instances, the child's age, grade, and/or disability were redacted to protect
the confidentiality of the child. The total number of cases examined in which
the child's age or grade 1 s6 was identified was 76. The total number of cases in
which the child's disability was identified was 65.
Out of the 76 cases that identified the child's age or grade, 6 involved a
child in the 2 years of pre-kindergarten (ages 3 and 4); 27 involved a child in
the 6 years of elementary school (ages 5 through 10); 13 involved a child in the
3 years of middle school (ages 11 through 13); and 30 involved a child in the 4
years of high school (ages 14 through 18).157
Although these totals appear at first blush to present a relative increase
in fully litigated contested cases involving high school children with
disabilities, given the small sample size, this difference is not statistically
significant.158 The grade of the child with a disability at issue has no

155
Causation cannot be determined from these numbers, and factors beyond the scope of this
research may influence this outcome. Notably, three of the four parents of pre-kindergarten
children with autism had legal counsel and the fourth parent was an attorney himself.
156
Of the decisions in which a child's age and/or grade are identified, some decisions identify
only the child's grade, others identify only the child's age, and still others identify both. For
purposes of this analysis, the Author used common age ranges for grades in North Carolina to
establish grades for students whose grades were not identified. It then utilized grade to determine
whether a particular grade or school type was more or less likely to appear in a contested dueprocess proceeding litigated to full decision by an ALJ.
1
Generally speaking, the ages identified in the text correspond with the grades specified.
There are a few instances, of course, in which a child had been held back for a year or two, and
his age exceeded the ages typically found in a particular group of grades. In these instances, the
child was included in the grade grouping specified for the child, regardless of the child's age.
158
Overall, this sample included an average of 5.07 first-tier written decisions per grade.
When broken down by grade, it included an average of only 3 first-tier written decisions per
grade in the pre-school years, 4.5 first-tier written decisions per grade in elementary school, 4.3
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statistically significant bearing on the likelihood that a parent will press a claim
through a hearing to a written decision by an ALJ.
Similarly, and as one would expect, the win/loss rates for parents at
each grade level (pre-kindergarten, elementary, middle, and high school) are
constant, with no statistically significant variance.' 59 In other words, parents are
no more likely to win or lose should they bring a claim at a particular stage in
their child's education.
The same is true with respect to the likelihood that parents will proceed
pro se, without legal representation. Although more parents of high school
students appeared pro se than did parents of students at other stages, this
heightened ratio is not statistically significant applying Pearson's Chi-squared
test to compare this sample to the population at large.'
In the group of 65 cases that identified the child's disability or
disabilities, 38 cases (58.5%) involved a child with multiple disabilities. 16 ' In
all of these cases, a wide variety of disabilities were identified. This group
included, inter alia, anxiety disorder, Asperger's Syndrome, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, autism, bipolar disorder, blindness, cerebral palsy,
deafness, depression, developmental delay, diabetes, dyslexia, emotional
disturbance, Fragile X Syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder, oppositional
defiant disorder, quadriplegia, seizure disorder, and speech impairments.1 6 2
Of the cases presented, two notable patterns emerge with respect to
autism. First, in the six pre-kindergarten cases, involving children ages three
and four, autism is identified as one of the child's disabilities in four of the six
cases. In other words, autism appeared in 66.6% of the pre-kindergarten
decisions over this 12-year period. In contrast, autism only appeared in 10 of
the 59 cases across other age groups; this means that from kindergarten through
high school, autism appeared in only 16.9% of the decisions over this 12-year
first-tier written decisions per grade in middle school, and a more substantial 7.5 first-tier written
decisions per grade in high school. Nonetheless, this apparent increase in fully litigated cases in
high school is not statistically significant (p = .07) using a Chi-squared test.
159
The Chi-squared test produced a p-value of .90, indicating no significant difference from
expected values across grade levels.
160
The Chi-squared test produced a p-value of .52, indicating no significant difference from
expected values across grade levels.
161
Three additional cases asserted the child at issue had "multiple disabilities" without
specifying those disabilities with any greater precision. See Student v. Buncombe Cty. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., No. 08 EDC 2971 (N.C. Office of Admin Hrgs. Aug. 17, 2009); Student v.
Hertford Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 09 EDC 2330 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. July 16, 2009);
Student v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 07 EDC 1605 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Nov. 29,
2007). These 3 cases were not included in the 65 with identified multiple disabilities.
162
One interesting observation is that of the 65 cases in which disability was specified, 22
included a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD), and most diagnoses of ADD or ADHD appeared co-morbid with other
diagnoses. Only four cases in the sample studied involved a child with ADD or ADHD and no
other co-diagnosis.
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period. The disproportionate number of fully litigated cases involving autism in
pre-kindergarten is a statistically significant anomaly, even taking into account
the small sample size. "3

Second, parents of all children with autism were more likely than
parents of children with any other disability to retain legal counsel for their
first-tier special-education hearing. Of the 14 autism cases in this sample, 12
(85.7%) had representation. In contrast, only 22 of the 49 cases (44.9%) in
which representation status was clear in the written decision, in which disability
was specified, and in which autism was not involved, had representation. This
difference in the rate of representation in cases involving autism is statistically
significant. 164
Recognizing that autism stands out as a disability with outlier results
invites additional research here.1 65 This is particularly so because these parents
have accessed legal representation, which correlates with greater success rates
for families, at higher rates than parents of children with other disabilities.1 66
More broadly, however, neither age nor disability of the child shows a
statistically significant impact on outcomes or parental choices regarding
representation in special-education due-process proceedings.
B.

TraditionalSchool-System Data

School systems initiate due-process proceedings in markedly fewer
numbers than parents of children with disabilities. To keep these cases in
context, this section begins with data demonstrating that most school systems
over the 12-year period studied were not involved in hearings litigated through
to a full, written decision at all, neither as a petitioner nor as a respondent.' 67

Statistical significance using Pearson's Chi-squared test demonstrates that this occurrence
was unlikely to have been by chance (p = .0015).
164
Statistical significance using Pearson's Chi-squared test demonstrates that this occurrence
was unlikely to have been by chance (p = .0018).
165
Professor Colker noted in her research that parents of children with autism are more likely
than parents of children with other disabilities to bring due process in Ohio, Florida, and
California, but not in D.C. COLKER, supra note 24, at 148, 161, 211.
166
Other scholars have examined access to representation and hearing success using parental
wealth as a factor. See, e.g., Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How
IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Correctionsfrom the Frontlines of Special
Education Lawyering, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 107, 156-59 (2011). Wealth
information was not available to this Author, making it impossible for this Author to determine
whether parental representation of parents of children with autism, or other disabilities, correlated
with parental wealth.
167
It is likewise true that most North Carolina parents of children with disabilities are not
involved in due-process proceedings that extend through to full, written decision following a
first-tier hearing before an ALJ. See supra Part [V.A (offering explanation of similar data on
parents).
163
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1. Most Traditional School Systems Are Not Involved in Due-Process
Proceedings
North Carolina's cities and municipalities operate 115 school systems
across the State. Of those 115 traditional public school systems, only 31 over
the period studied were involved in special-education due-process proceedings
that have gone to full hearing and required a written decision by an ALJ. This
means that only 27% of North Carolina's traditional public school systems
have been involved in contested complaints-in this context--over the past 12
years. Most traditional public school systems have avoided special-education
disputes or resolved them prior to a full hearing culminating in a written
decision by an ALJ.
North Carolina maintains 2,613 traditional public schools.168 Of those
schools, only 93 at most (excluding from the total number of cases considered
in this study the 4 cases involving charter schools) have been involved in these
contested special-education matters. This means that at most 3.5% of North
Carolina's traditional public schools have been involved in contested specialeducation disputes that could not be resolved prior to a written decision by an
ALJ.
It is impossible, however, to determine which schools, in particular,
have been involved in these cases. In most available ALJ decisions, the name
of the school attended by the child with a disability was redacted as
confidential student information. But even assuming that each case involving a
traditional public school identifies a "new" school that was not a party to
another due-process proceeding over the period studied,169 it is clear that the
overwhelming majority of the State's traditional public schools, at least 96.3%
of them, were not involved in contested special-education disputes over the 12year period studied.
2. School Systems Rarely Initiate Claims
School systems initiated the proceedings in only 3 out of 97 cases that
persisted through issuance of a final ALJ decision. In other words, since 2000,
school systems have initiated only 3.1% of all due-process matters that required
a full hearing before resolution. And although parents have initiated due-

Derrick Meador, North CarolinaEducation, ABOUT EDUCATION, http://teaching.about.com/
od/ProfilesInEducation/a/North-Carolina-Education.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
169
This is unlikely given that the decisions evaluated suggest by their particulars, in some
instances, that the same parent and student are involved in multiple claims in a single year. But it
cannot be conclusively established because the identities of the parent and child are redacted
from these decisions as required by law.
168
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process proceedings each year over the period studied, a school system has not
initiated a fully tried due-process proceeding since 2004. "0
With a sample size this small, the data reflected cannot be understood
to represent trends. Instead, it simply informs about the outcomes in this group
of cases. With that caveat, this Article offers the following data.
One initial noteworthy observation appears: although the set of dueprocess complaints initiated by school systems from 2000 through 2012 is
much smaller than the set of due-process complaints initiated by parents over
the same period, the "win rate" is larger.
School-system petitioners prevailed on all issues in their complaints
66.7% of the time. Of the three due-process complaints initiated by schoolsystem petitioners, school-system petitioners prevailed in two. Both "winning"
due-process complaints involved school-system efforts to evaluate a child to
determine the child's eligibility for special educational services over parents'
objections. Both "winning" due-process complaints involved pro se parent
respondents.171

A school-system petitioner has lost only once. 172 In that case, the
school system sought to establish that a child with a disability could be
excluded from school as a danger to himself and others.' 73 The AU determined
that the school system failed to meet its burden of proof and did not
demonstrate that maintaining the child in his current educational placement was
substantially likely to result in injury to the child or others.1 74 This schoolsystem complaint involved a representedparent respondent.' 75
The following table reflects some of the data described above in this
section. It illustrates, in a format intended to facilitate side-by-side comparisons
of tier-one outcomes, each of the following pieces of data: (1) the number of
due-process complaints filed and pursued through a full hearing by both parents
of children with disabilities and schools systems from 2000 through 2012, (2)
the number of cases in which the particular petitioner prevailed on all issues

170
The only three instances in the data sample considered in this analysis in which a school
system initiated a due-process proceeding occurred in 2000, 2001, and 2004.
171
See supra Part IV.A.3 (offering an analysis of the statistical significance of the correlation

between parental representation and favorable parental outcomes and demonstrating the
increased likelihood of school-system success in claims brought by pro se parents).
172
See Cumberland Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mr., No. 00 EDC 046 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Feb. 12, 2001).
173
Id., slip op. at 2. The federal authority relied upon to initiate this due-process complaint
was repealed and replaced in the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA.
174

175

Id.
Id. at 3.
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over that same period,17 6 and (3) the percentage of cases in which each type of
petitioner prevailed before an ALJ on all issues presented for hearing.'"

Type of Petitioner

Percentage of cases pursued through issuance of a written ALJ
decision from 2000 through 2012 in which this party prevailed
on all claims presented in their complaint.

Parent of a Child with
a Disability (both pro

13.8%

se and represented)
n = 94
School System

n = 13

Educating a Child

66.7%

with a Disability

n= 2

n= 3

As noted, the cause of the disparate outcomes reflected in the first-tier
AU decisions considered here cannot be determined from the information
presented. And the sample size in cases in which complaints were initiated by
school systems is too small to extract outcome trends.7
But other data points discernable from these records can be and have
been explored. As noted above, of the factors considered in this study, the
variable most highly correlated with particular outcomes is parental
representation by counsel. 17 9 Even this variable, however, cannot be identified
as the cause of the disparate outcomes reflected here based on the study
conducted. This research invites further exploration of causal influences on
outcomes.

This table reflects outcomes in cases in which petitioners prevailed on all issues identified
in their due-process complaints because in a majority of cases, ALJs resolve all issues in favor of
a single party. Of the first-tier final ALJ decisions considered in preparation of this Article,
86.6% ended with a single party prevailing on all issues. In only a relatively small minority of
cases (13.4%), the ALJ reached a split decision and determined that each party prevailed on
portions of the complaint.
"7
Some of the outcomes reflected in this chart were appealed to the second-tier
administrative review before a State Hearing Review Officer. In those cases, the State Hearing
Review Officer may (or may not) have reversed some of the AU outcomes during the secondtier review.
178
When comparing "win" rates of school petitioners to parent petitioners, the schools'
higher win rate as petitioners is consistent with schools' overall win rate and does not show
statistical significance compared to parent petitioners' win rates using Pearson's Chi-squared
measure (p = .55). This data is offered here only to show historically what has happened in these
cases.
176

179

See supra Part IV.A.3.
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3. In this Sample, Urban School Systems Were Only Slightly More
Likely than Rural School Systems to Face Represented Parents in
Due Process, but the Difference Was Not Statistically Significant
Parents of children with disabilities in North Carolina's urban and rural
counties are almost equally involved in contested special-education disputes
that press through first-tier hearings to written decision. For purposes of this
analysis, a county was considered "urban" if it had a population over 250,000
according to 2012 census data. By this measure, Mecklenburg (including
Charlotte, North Carolina, and a population of 967,971), Wake (including
Raleigh, North Carolina, and a population of 952,143), Guilford (including
Greensboro, North Carolina, and a population of 501,018), Forsyth (including
Winston Salem, North Carolina, and a population of 357,850), Cumberland
(including Fayetteville, North Carolina and a population of 323,011), and
Durham (including Durham, North Carolina, and a population of 282,081)
counties are included in the "urban" group.iso
Of the 97 decisions in this 12-year study, 40 (41.2%) arose from claims
filed in urban school systems and 57 (58.8%) arose in rural school systems.
In urban systems, 19 out of 36 cases (52.8%) in which representation
status was known involved parents with legal representation. In rural systems,
21 out of 51 cases (41.2%) in which representation status is known involved
parents with legal representation. Although school systems in urban
communities were slightly more likely than school systems in rural
communities to face represented parents in due process in the population of
cases studied, this difference is not statistically significant given the sample
size. 181
C. CharterSchool Data
School-system petitioners prevailed in the first tier of administrative
review in 66.7% of all special-education due-process cases they initiated.
School-system respondents prevailed at the same level of review on at least one
issue in 81 of the cases they defended, or 86.2% of the time. These are
impressive winning percentages, and they inspire curiosity about whether all
public school systems-charter and traditional-prevail at equal rates.
This section offers background on charter schools' obligations toward
children with disabilities under the IDEA and North Carolina law, considers
charter schools' enrollment of children with disabilities, and provides charter

180
See North CarolinaPopulation by Count-Total Residents, U.S.PLACES.COM, http://www.
us-places.com/North-Carolina/population-by-County.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
181
The difference in representation status between urban and rural communities is not
statistically significant using Pearson's Chi-squared test (p = .377).
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school special-education litigation outcome data derived from final ALJ
decisions issued over the 12-year period covered in this study.
The IDEA provides that children in charter schools are entitled to
special-education services to the same extent as children in traditional public
schools. IDEA's regulations state plainly that "[c]hildren with disabilities who
attend public charter schools and their parents retain all rights" under the
Act. 182
The IDEA's regulations distinguish between charter schools that stand
alone as independent local educational agencies (LEAs) and charter schools
that are part of a network of public schools within an overarching LEA. 183 In
North Carolina, charter schools operate as independent LEAs for purposes of
the provision of special-education services to children with disabilities. 184 As
such, IDEA's regulations require each North Carolina charter school to be
individually "responsible for ensuring that the requirements of [the Act] are
met." 185
North Carolina's charter school legislation further emphasized, during
the period covered by this research, that a charter school "shall not discriminate
against any student on the basis of . . . disability."l8 6 The State's current
legislation continues to provide that a charter school cannot, except as stated in
the approved charter document, "limit admission to students on the basis of
intellectual ability, measures of achievement or aptitude, athletic ability, [or]
disability," among other things. 87
Despite the clarity in the relevant law, "questions have been raised
about whether charter schools are appropriately serving students with
disabilities."18 8 According to the Government Accounting Office,
Charter schools [have historically] enrolled a lower percentage
of students with disabilities than traditional public schools....
In school year 2009-2010, which was the most recent data
available at the time of our review, approximately 11 percent
182
34 C.F.R. § 300.209(a) (2015); see also id. § 300.2(b)(1)(ii) (stating that the provisions of
the Act "[a]pply to all political subdivisions of the State that are involved in the education of
children with disabilities, including . . . [l]ocal educational agencies [traditional public school
systems] . . . and public charter schools").

Id. § 300.209(b)-(d).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-106.3(l1)(b) (2015).
185
34 C.F.R. § 300.209(c).
186
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(g)(5) (2013) (recodified and amended 2014).
187
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-218.45(c) (2015) (as amended in the 2015 session, 2015 N.C.
Sess. Laws ch, 248, § 3.(b), http://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/sessionlaws/html/2015183

184

2016/sl2015-248.html).
188
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, CHARTER SCHOOLS: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ATTENTION

NEEDED TO PROTECT ACCESS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES

2 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/

assets/600/591435.pdf.
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of students enrolled in traditional public schools were students
with disabilities compared to about 8 percent of students
enrolled in charter schools. 189
This statistical disparity holds true in North Carolina, although North
Carolina's disparity is not as great as the national one. During the 2009-2010
school year, the most recent year with available data, North Carolina's
traditional public schools enrolled 1% more students with disabilities than its
charter schools.' 90 Notably, this measure does not take into account the nature
of the disabilities in the children enrolled in each type of public school. It only
takes into account the number of children with a disability of any kind.
Observers of charter school impacts have raised concerns not only that
charter schools enroll fewer children with disabilities than traditional public
schools, but also that the educational outcomes for those children in charter
schools are not as favorable as for the same children in traditional public
schools. In North Carolina, though, researchers report mixed educational
impacts resulting from charter education of children with disabilities. This
research suggests that North Carolina's charter schools generally (when
compared to traditional public schools generally) offer some educational
benefits and some drawbacks.
According to Stanford University's Center for Research on Educational
Outcomes, North Carolina's charter school students with disabilities performed
better than traditional school students with disabilities on reading
assessments' 91 but performed worse than traditional school students with
disabilities on math assessments.1 9 2
Although charter schools must ensure their students with disabilities
receive the education to which they are entitled under the IDEA, and although
mixed reviews exist regarding their success in doing that effectively, only four
due-process complaints against North Carolina's charter schools have resulted
in issuance of a final ALJ decision over the twelve-year period subject to this
analysis.1 9 3 The first charter school case to result in issuance of an ALJ decision
arose in 2009, and there were two ALJ decisions issued that year. Then, two
additional cases arose and were resolved in 2012.

189

Id.

190

Id.

at 8; see also

CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY

STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL

18, 39 (2013), http://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%

20Final%20Draft.pdf.
191

STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 190, at 42.

192

Id. at 43.

See Student v. Union Acad. Charter Sch., No. 12 EDC 12388 (N.C. Office of Admin.
Hrgs. Feb. 4, 2013); Student v. Union Acad. Charter Sch., No. 12 EDC 1501 (N.C. Office of
Admin. Hrgs. May 25, 2012); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2329 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs.
Dec. 2009); Student v. T.D., No. 09 EDC 2328 (N.C. Office of Admin. Hrgs. Dec. 2009).
193
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Of the four ALJ decisions issued in due-process complaints against
charter schools, the charter schools prevailed on at least one issue in 100% of
the cases. The charter schools prevailed on all issues in 50% of the cases.
Considering the four charter school cases in isolation, then, these
schools appear to have fared comparably to traditional public schools 94 in the
first-tier administrative review in special-education litigation. In other words,
no meaningful difference in litigation outcomes at the first-tier administrative
review in special-education cases appears in the data considered.
Notably, however, because the number of charter school decisions
available for review is so small, the results produced through this analysis are
not reliable to indicate trends. Instead, they may fairly be viewed only as
reporting on outcomes in these specific instances rather than as a predictor of
outcomes in charter school cases generally. 9s
Equally notable, the cause of the limited number of fully litigated dueprocess complaints against charter schools is beyond the scope of this research
and cannot be determined from the information available here. 196 Likewise the
cause of charter schools' high success rate in special-education litigation at the
first-tier administrative review cannot be determined from the data available
here.
V. CONCLUSION: WRAPPING UP AND LOOKING FORWARD
With nearly 100 ALJ decisions in special-education cases catalogued
and analyzed, this research is only the beginning. Much work remains to be
done, but some strong data trends emerged early.
Most strikingly, attorneys make a material difference. Outcomes
overall are "better" for parties who have them. Also notably, the number of
fully litigated cases increased in North Carolina over the period studied, even
after the addition of new, free-to-the-parties alternative dispute resolution
options.

194
Charter schools actually fared slightly worse than traditional public schools. Charter
schools won outright in only two of four cases (50%). Traditional public schools won outright in
68 out of 93 cases (73.1%). But this difference was not statistically significant using Pearson's
Chi-squared measure (p = .08).
19
See supra note 146 (noting that p = .08 on this data point).
196
The sample of charter school decisions may be small for any number of reasons, some
suggesting favorable things about the provision of special education in those schools and others
suggesting unfavorable things about it. For example, it may be that there are few cases because
parents and children are served consistently in accordance with the IDEA and state law or
because charter schools respond promptly and effectively to correct errors when they arise. On
the other hand, it may be that there are few cases because violations are so egregious that parents
abandon charter schools entirely and return to traditional public schools without seeking relief or
because charter schools settle cases promptly knowing their violations of the law are apparent
and egregious. It is impossible to determine based on the sample presented.
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More fundamentally, of course, the IDEA and its state counterpart
represent meaningful progress from the pre-legislation era in which parental
participation in the educational process for their children with disabilities was
criminalized. While parents may not prevail in most cases, particularly when
they proceed pro se, their participation is encouraged and protected. Parents
know that and exercise their rights, finding at least occasional success in the
process.
The broad and ongoing goal of this research remains to identify and
communicate information that might assist all participants in the specialeducation process-public school administrators, educators, resource
personnel, and support staff, as well as parents and family members of children
with disabilities (along with the attorneys for each)-in realizing the ideal
expressed in the IDEA nearly 40 years ago: to accept "[d]isability [as] a natural
part of the human experience [that] in no way diminishes the right of
individuals to participate in or contribute to society" and to "[i]mprov[e]
educational results for children with disabilities"197 so that they might secure an
opportunity to do what they are "fitted to do."l 9 8
All involved in special education, in schools and in homes, in
courtrooms and in offices, work hard every day to fulfill the law's objectives.
This research seeks and shares its data so that it might inform conversations
about how to make this work easier, and less adversarial, for schools and
families down the road.

'

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2013).
See JoHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 308 (1944) (stating that "to find out what
one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness").
198
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